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CHAPTER 24 
State and Local Government 
MITCHELL J. SIKORA, JR. 
A. CouRT DECISIONS 
§24.1. Introduction. Decisional law in the area of state and local 
government during the 1970 SuRVEY year could be organized under 
several themes of stability and change. For the most part, the Supreme 
Judicial Court gave little reason to doubt its devotion to the doctrine 
of stare decisis. On matters of municipal tort liability, as well as prop-
erty and tax interests, it reapplied settled definitions. On issues of 
doubtful or competing authority between state and municipality, the 
Court consistently upheld the spirit of Dillon's Rule/ most conspic-
uously by restrictive construction of the Home Rule Amendment.2 
The Court's assent to change in the law continued to spring predom-
inantly from its deference for legislation. Thus it favored vigorous 
application of the conflict of interest statute and a liberal construction 
of legislation obviously designed to capture federal funds for local 
housing purposes. Showing that legislation can serve stability as well 
as change, it upheld the 1821 statutory taxation plan of Suffolk 
County. And acknowledging the clear mandate of the United States 
Supreme Court, it ordered reapportionment of the Commonwealth's 
senatorial districts. 
Meanwhile the legislature, in the light of an election year, did not 
overlook local governmental instrumentalities in the enactment of 
both fashionable and necessary legislation. Most visible was legislation 
enabling local rent and eviction control, environmental regulation, 
consumer protection, and economic development. Of these possibili-
ties, rent control seems destined to be the most implemented and con-
troverted program. The success or failure of the remaining schemes 
turns directly on the local initiative. 
§24.2. Municipal tort liability. Approving Supreme Judicial 
Court watchers are inclined to stress the virtues of continuity in the 
MITCHELL J. SIKORA, JR. is a member of the Massachusetts Bar. 
§24.1. 1 In capsule, the rule states: "Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt con-
cerning the existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the [municipal] 
corporation and the power is denied." I Dillon, Municipal Corporations §237 (5th 
ed. 1911). 
2 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89. For an analysis of the amendment, see 1967 Ann. 
Surv. Mass. Law c. 16. 
1
Sikora: Chapter 24: State and Local Government
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
§24.2 STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 575 
law as preserved by that tribunal. During the 1970 SuRVEY year the 
Court affirmed continuity in the law of municipal tort liability in the 
decisions of Reynolds Boat Co. v. City of Haverhill1 and Standard Pa-
per & Merchandise Co. v. City of Springfield.2 Both cases turned on the 
traditional distinction between a municipality's governmental func-
tions and its proprietary activities, and on the resulting general rule 
of municipal tort immunity in the performance of the former and the 
exception of liability in instances of the latter. The Haverhill case il-
lustrated the general rule, the Springfield case the exception.s 
In the Haverhill case, the plaintiff boat company alleged that the 
negligent failure of the city to maintain adequate water service 
through the nearest hydrant resulted in fire damage to its property. 
The plaintiff also averred a "promise," apparently implied, by the 
city to provide adequate water service to hydrants. The Court made 
short work of these allegations. Invoking the 1877 decision in Tainter 
v. Worcester, where the Court first held that fire protection is under-
taken "for the benefit of the public and without pecuniary compensa-
tion,"4 it first brushed aside the notion of an implied "promise" by 
the city. The service of fire protection creates no contract with, or li-
ability to, property owners for municipal failure to furnish water. And, 
of course, the policy distinction between the extent of a municipality's 
undertaking in a governmental function, like fire protection, and its 
undertaking in commercial activity continues intact in Massachusetts, 
as in most jurisdictions. The Court rejected any intimations to the 
contrary which might be gleaned from Cole Drug Co. v. City of Bos-
ton,5 a 1950 decision involving a mixed system of a commercial water 
§24.2. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 260 N.E.2d 176. This case is the subject of a 
student comment in §24.21 infra. 
2 356 Mass. 475, 253 N.E.2d 337 (1969). 
3 For a recent attack on traditional doctrine, see Note, Assault on the Citadel: 
De-immunizing Municipal Corporations, 4 Suffolk U.L. Rev. 832 (1970). Immunity as 
a common law rule is generally traced to the 1788 English decision, Russell v. Men 
of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788), and was relied upon in the first 
Massachusetts case, Mower v. Leicester, 9 Mass. 247 (1812). Both cases involved 
injuries suffered on defective municipal bridges. 
The first Massachusetts decision to apply the rule of exception and to hold a 
city liable for torts committed in the performance of its proprietary functions was 
Thayer v. Boston, 36 Mass. 511 (1837), where the city, in the process of constructing 
new market facilities for rental to private tenants, obstructed the passageway in 
front of plaintiff's warehouse and caused the desertion of his tenants. The city's 
activity for income, said Chief Justice Shaw, made it liable as a proprietor. 
Despite its certainty in the present cases, the Supreme Judicial Court has not 
', always found the distinction between governmental and proprietary activity easily 
drawn, as municipal functions have grown increasingly variegated. See, e.g., Dickin-
son v. Boston, 188 Mass. 595, 75 N.E. 68 (1905) (fall of defective lamp post); Orlando 
v. Brockton, 295 Mass. 205, 3 N.E.2d 794 (1936) (operation of an almshouse); Baum-
gardner v. Boston, 304 Mass. 100, 23 N.E.2d 121 (1939) (turning on the source and 
amount of income to the city from refuse collection). 
4 123 Mass. 311, 316 (18!7). 
5 326 Mass. 199, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950). 
2
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main and a lateral pipe used exclusively to carry water from the main 
to a fire hydrant. After a break occurred at the junction of the lateral 
pipe and the hydrant, city repairmen negligently failed to shut off the 
main supply of water within a reasonable time, and excessive flooding 
damaged the goods of a nearby storekeeper. The Court was careful to 
base municipal liability on the negligent delay in shutting off the 
main water supply since it was also the commercial water supply. This 
rationale preserved the traditional rule, at least as an exercise in logic.6 
As a matter of policy, one might well question the equity wisdom of 
turning liability for negligent city repair efforts on the fortuities of 
the pipeline system.7 
The Court's ,concluding passage in the Haverhill case does not per-
mit any prospect for a judicial modification of present law: "Any 
change in the policy of this Commonwealth extending the undertak-
ing of municipalities so as to create liability to individual property 
owners for damage caused by inadequacies in the system of fire pro-
tection, must lie with the Legislature."B 
But in those proprietary functions especially committed to its re-
sponsibility, the municipality continues to be held to duties of "rea-
sonable judgment, skill and care, according to the approved usages 
of ... [the] trade."9 In the Springfield case, the plaintiff sought flood 
damages incurred to its cellar storage as the result of a broken water 
meter. The meter, installed 39 years before and periodically tested at 
seven-year intervals by the city water department, had last received 
an "accuracy test" about four years and nine months bdore it appar-
6 Chief Justice Wilkins authored both the present decision and, as an Associate 
Justice, the Cole Drug Company holding in 1950. 
7 The Cole Drug Company case remains a potentially useful decision for plain-
tiffs, if only to dramatize the possible inequity resulting from a rigid application 
of the governmental-propriety distinction in water main cases. As the Court left 
the law, city repairmen can, with immunity, continue to bungle the maintenance 
of an integrated water main system so long as they are fortunate enough to leave 
unrepaired the governmental rather than the proprietary pipe. One can continue 
to hypothesize pipeline arrangements which strain the logic of that holding. 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 987, 260 N.E.2d 176, 178. Immunity has, of course, been 
under attack by distinguished commentators for some time. Most have urged legis-
lative abrogation. The classic treatment is Borchard's six articles, Government Lia-
bility in Tort, 34 Yale L.J. 1, 129, 229 (1924-1925), and Government Responsibility in 
Tort, 36 Yale L.J. 1, 757, 1039 (1926-1927). Other significant works include Fuller 
and Casner, Municipal Tort Liability in Operation, 54 HARV. L. REv. 437 (1941); 
Harno, Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations, 4 Ill. L.Q. 28 (1921); Repko, 
American Legal Commentary on the Doctrines of Municipal Tort Liability, 9 Law 
&: Contemp. Prob. 214 (1942). For recommended legislation see Cobey, New Cali-
fornia Governmental Tort Liability Statutes, 1 Harv. J. Legis. 16 (1964); Van 
Alstyne, Governmental Tort Liability: Judicial Law Making in a Statutory Milieu, 
15 Stan. L. Rev. 163 (1963). 
9 Standard Paper &: Merchandise Co. v. City of Springfield, 356 Mass. 475, 253 
N.E.2d 337, 338 (1969). The Court points especially to Friese v. Boston Consol. Gas 
Co., 324 Mass. 623, 628-629, 88 N.E.2d 1, 5 (1949), and to Kelley v. Laraway, 223 
Mass. 182, 184, III N.E. 794, 795 (1916). 
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ently bur~t. Expert testimony was introduced on the rate of corrosion 
qf such a cast iron meter, its visible deterioration in thickness, and its 
susceptibility to. fracture from occasional surges in water pressure, as 
was evidence that the water department's last accuracy test had not 
inc.uded a check of water pressure at the premises, or a pressure test 
of the meter itself. Finally, the evidence failed to show a visual in-
spection of the nieter prior to reinstallation. This much, said the Court, 
was sufficient to take the case to the jury over the city's motion for a 
directed verdict, and to subject the city to the standard of reasonable 
skill under the approved usages of the trade.1o 
§24.3. Municipal property. The power of the Commonwealth to 
regu.ate by legislation the property interests of its cities and towns re-
ceived careful restatement in the decision of City of Cambridge v. 
Commissioner of Public Welfare.1 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Quirico was called upon to apply primary principles of municipal 
property rights and liabilities to the aftermath of a sweeping realloca-
tion of state and local welfare responsibilities. 
The controversy grew from the comprehensive transfer of welfare 
administration from the cities and towns to the Commonwealth as of 
July 1, 1968.2 This reorganization of welfare administration and con-
comitant -financial responsibility included the operation of the old age 
assistance program of Chapter 118 of the General Laws. Under Section 
4 of that chapter, as it stood before July 1, 1968, Cambridge had taken 
liens on a number of parcels of real estate, or on interests in real es-
tate, owned by recipients of -old· age assistance, and recorded them in 
the registry of deeds. As of the effective date of the new act, the city 
held a number of such liens on which no judicial proceedings for en-
forcement had · begun.3 The commissioner of public welfare subse-
quently released a number of such liens "upon request of interested 
10 356 Mass. 475, -,-, 253 N.E.2d337, 339 (1969). 
§24.3. .11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 257 N.E.2d 782; Cambridge brought a bill in 
equity against :the Commissioner of Public Welfare; under G.L., c. 23l'A, for a 
declaratory decree. The case was heard· in the Superior Court on a statement of 
agreed facts, and was reserved and reported without decision to the Supreme 
Judicial Court. 
2 Acts ·of 1967, c. 658. The a~t transferred ·to the Commonwealth responsibilities 
formerly delegated to ·local government by a number of statutes "establishing a 
c_omprehensive municipally administered welfare program for furnishing aid and 
assistance to various segments of the inhabitants of the Commonwealth." 1970 
Mass. Adv. Sh..423, 428, 207· N.E.2d 782; 786. "The total program included aid to 
veterans under c. 115, aid to poor apd indigent persons generally under c. 117, aid 
to ,fa1pilies with. dependent children under c. 118, aid to the aged under c. 118A, 
and aid to disabled persons under c. ll.8D." Id. Chapter 658 of the· Acts of 1967 
transferred · to. the Commonwealth · administration of all programs except aid to 
:Veterans under. Chapter- 115, and. relieved the municipalities ftom financial re-
spOnsibility for the functions so transferred . 
. li-Where preceedings·4ad been begun, the Acts of 1967/t. 658,.§8o;·authorized 
their' compietion by the Department of Public Wel@;e~2: . ' : : .· . .. . . '· 
4
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persons and for the purpose of clearing record titles of such liens,'' 
The commissioners did not ask the city to transfer any such liens to 
the Commonwealth or offer to pay the city any consideration for 
them.4 While the case was befqre the Superior Court, legislation was 
enacted to provide expressly that "liens given by recipients to the 
cities and towns under any assistance program administered by the 
department of public welfare prior to the enactment of [the welfare 
reorganization law] are hereby abolished. A release of such liens shall 
be given by the treasurer of such city or town." 5 The issue at hand, 
then, became whether the Massachusetts Constitution permitted the 
legislature to abolish these old age assistance liens without requiring 
the Commonwealth to compensate the municipalities for their loss of 
those property interests. 
The Court's inquiry began with a recitation of basic principles con-
trolling the power of the legislature to deal with the property of the 
municipalities.o The dual character of a municipality as a governmen-
tal agency of the state and a proprietary corporation determines the 
susceptibility of particular property to legislative control. Property 
which a municipality has acquired and owns as a governmental agency 
of the state, and which it holds solelyfor public use, is subject to leg-
islative control. It may be transferred to some other agency of govern-
ment charged with the same duties, or it may be taken from the 
municipality by the Commonwealth and devoted to other public uses 
and purposes without payment of compensation.7 Still, the legislative 
power to take or transfer this class of property remains limited. That 
power is to be exercised only for the achievement of some public pur-
pose under the Massachusetts Constitution.s 
On the other hand, property which a municipality holds in its pri-
vate or proprietarycapacity is not subject to the same legislative con-
4 "During the fiscal years ending Jur:ie 30, 1967, and June 30, 1968, the sums of 
$953,256.82 and $1,271,346.98 were recovered~ respectively, on liens of this type 
throughout the Commonwealth. These sums -were- distributed -as follows: 12% to 
cities and towns, 60% to the Federal government, and 20% to the Commonwealth." 
1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 424, 257 N.E.2d 782, 784. 
5 Acts .of 1969, c. 885, §28. 
6 The Court found these principles enunciated in Higginson v. Treasurer and 
School House Com mrs. of Boston, 212 ~Mass. 583, 584:585, 99 N.E. 523, 524-525 (1912). 
7 See Worcester v. Commonwealth, 345 Mass. 99, 100, l85 N.E.2d 633, 634 (1962); 
Massachusetts Turnpike Authority v. Commonwealth, 347 Mass. 524, 526·529, 199 
N.E.2d 175, 177-178 (1964). 
s Part II, c. 1, §1, art. 4, states that "full power and authority are hereby given 
and granted to the said general court, from time to time, to make, ordain, and 
establish, all manner of wholesome and reasonable orders, laws, statutes, ·and 
ordinances, directions and instructions, ... so as the same be not repugnant or 
contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good- and welfare of 
this commonwealth, and for the government and ordering thereof, and of the 
subjects of the same .... " See Horrigan v. Mayor of Pittsfield, 298 Mass. 492, 497: 
500, 11 N.E.2d 585, 588-590 (1937); Berube v. Selectmen of Edgartown, !136 Mass. 
634, 638, 147 N.E.2d 180, 184 (1958). ·· , . . . . 
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trol as that held in its governmental capacity. While this class of 
property also may be taken for public purposes, the Commonwealth 
must compensate the municipality for it. The municipality enjoys the 
same right to just compensation as an individual under Article 10 of 
the Declaration of Rights.9 
In the main case, the old age assistance liens remained to be char-
acterized as property held in a municipality's governmental or private 
capacity. For guiding classifications of municipal functions, the Court 
consulted the analogous law of municipal tort liability for negligence, 
its imposition of liability in proprietary activitylo and its bestowal of 
immunity in clearly governmental functions.n The predominant case 
law involving municipal tort liability in the administration of general 
welfare programs characterized such effort as a governmental func-
tion.12 
In this light the Supreme Judicial Court held the old age assistance 
program as administered by the municipalities before July I, 1968, to 
have been clearly a governmental function, and all property acquired 
or held by communities in that function to have been held in a gov-
ernmental capacity. Consequently that property, including liens, re-
mained subject to legislative control, including the power to abolish 
liens without compensation to the municipalities, if done for the ac-
complishment of a public purpose. Here the general purpose of 
welfare reorganization was undeniably public, as was the specific sub-
sidiary purpose to facilitate that reorganization by abolition of the 
municipal liens in question. 
§24.4. Local taxation. In the law of taxation, town governments 
won a noteworthy victory of statutory construction under provisions 
requiring compensation by the Commonwealth to towns in lieu of 
tax revenue lost through state use of land for public institutions 
within the towns. Two provisions control such compensation. General 
Laws, c. 58, §17, authorizes such payments by the Commonwealth. 
9 Proprietors of Mount Hope Cemetery v. Boston, 158 Mass. 509, 511, 519, 33 
N.E. 695, 698-699 (1893). 
lOSee, e.g., Green v. West Springfield, 323 Mass. 335, 81 N.E.2d 819 (1948) 
(maintenance of sewer system); Harvard Furniture Co. v. Cambridge, 320 Mass. 227, 
68 N.E.2d 684 (1946) (construction and repair of water supply system); Galluzzi v. 
Beverly, 309 Mass. 135, 34 N.E.2d 492 (1941) (sewer construction); Sloper v. 
Quincy, 301 Mass. 20, 16 N.E.2d 14 (1938) (maintenance of water system). 
11 See, e.g., Hennessy v. Boston, 265 Mass. 559, 164 N.E. 470 (1929) (playground 
maintenance); Benton v. Trustees of Boston City Hosp., 140 Mass. 13, I N.E. 836 
(1885) (maintenance of hospital premises); Tainter v. Worcester, 123 Mass. 3II 
(1877) (hydrant maintenance); Hill v. Boston, 122 Mass. 344 (1877) (maintenance of 
.school premises). . . 
12The Court cited the administration of the general welfare law, G.L., c. II7, 
prior to July I, 1968, and especially G.L., c. 117 and c. 47, permitting a municipality 
to own and operate infirmaries to keep and care for persons entitled to such 
assistance. Despite the presence of some small income, it was consistently held that 
the operation of such infirmaries was a governmental function. See cases collected 
in 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 423, 427, 257 N.E.2d 782, 786. 
6
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"The treasurer in every year .. · . shall reimburse each town in which 
the commonwealth owns land for the purposes named in section thir-
teen an amount in lieu of taxes upon the value of such land as re-
ported to him by the commissioner .... " 
Section 13 provides that the State Tax Commissioner in every fifth 
year beginning from 1957 "shall ... determine ... the fair cash value 
of all land in every town owned by the commonwealth and used for 
the purposes of ... [public institutions including] the University of 
Massachusetts· .... " (Emphasis added.)1 ·In the light of the distribution 
of such public institutions across the Commonwealth, these provisions 
have potentially broad application to the towns, and the decision of 
Board of Assessors of Amherst v. State Tax Commission2 constitutes 
a significant affirmation of local tax interests. 
In this controversy the State Tax Commission had determined . that 
the "fair cash value" of all land owned by the Commonwealth in the 
town of Amherst and used by the University of Massachusetts as of 
January I, 1967, was $792,800. On the other hand, the Board of As-
sessors of Amherst had assessed the value-"of the university land; exchi-
sive of buildings, at $9,868,200, and had applied to the Appellate Tax 
Board for a correction of the commission's ·determination~ The board 
revised the fair cash value of the land to $1,342,610. The town assessors 
then appealed to the Supreme· Judicial Court.8 
To construe the term fair cash value of all land under Section 13, 
the Court scrutinized two conclusions drawn· by the board. First, the 
board had treated that phrase to mean the assessed valu.e rather than 
.the market value -o£ the land in question. 4 Second, it treated l_and as 
land in its original condition, exclusive of buildings and of improve-
ments of any kind, such as grading and drainage. 
The Court observed first that. both interpretations dearly varied 
from "the common and approved usage of the language.''' In the asseS;-
sors' view, fair cash value could mean. only the highest price which a 
hypothetical willing buyer would pay to a hypothetical willing seller 
in an assumed free and·open m~rket.5And land ~ould only meanland 
§24.4. 1 Other purposes . include wildlife pre~rvations, soldiers~ . homes1 state. f~{. 
ests, public institutions under the Departments of. Gorrection, .Edu.ciltion; .Melltill 
Health, Public Health, Public Welfare and Youth Secyices. Other land .includes 
that under the care and control of the Department of Natural Resources qr · .t.he 
Division of Public Beaches in the Department of Public Wor.~s and usee!. for 
recreational or conservation purposes; and all land held by county commissioners 
for hospital purposes, as well as all land held by. the Department of ,Public Work~ 
for use as solid waste disposal facilities. G.L., c. 58, .. §-Ill.. , · . .. :. ; 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 258 N.E.2d 5!19. . . 
3 G.L., c. 58A, §13. 
4 Authority at odds with this view includes Beal .. v. Bo~tQll, 166 l\fass. 53, 56.,. 4!1 
N.E. 1029, 1030 (1896); Vineyard Grove Co. v. Ou Bluffs, 265. Mass. 270, 277;:l63 
N.E. 888, 890 (1928). See. also G.L., c. 59, §3. , ... ·. . .. . · .·.. . . 
5_See Epstein v. Boston Housing Authority, 317 -.1\fass. 297,. 2,99, 58 N,E.2d. Jll!l,:-1~7 
(1944); Commissioner o.f Corps .. Be Taxation v •. Worcester .CpUiltY .Trust. Co., )105 
Mass.460,462,26N.E.2d305,ll07(1940). ;_:·.·; .· ... , ... ~;c; ,:; 
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in its condition on the date of valuation, inclusive of all improvements, 
but exclusive of all bui1dings. Since these interpretations constituted 
"common and approved usage," the burden rested upon the board to 
show a contrary or varying legislative intent.6 
The board sought such justification in the legislative history of 
Section 13. In equating fair cash value with assessed valuation) it re-
lied on a report made by the tax commissioner and attached to the 
bill which became the antecedent 1910 statute for the provisions in 
question.7 The commissioner's report committed the responsibility for 
valuation to the commissioner out of the fear that town assessments 
would produce self-serving disparities between the assessments of state 
and private land. From this recommendation, the board had inferred 
that the substitution of the commissioner for the local assessors im-
ported the substitution of fair cash value by assessed valuation. In any 
event, manipulated disparities between these terms were expressly pro-
hibited by the Court in Bettigole v. Assessors of Springfield)8 holding 
that all land must be assessed at full, fair cash value. 
Similarly, the Court rejected the board's second determination, that 
land here did not include improvements made upon it, but only un-
improved land. Again the board argued from the 1910 commissioner's 
report excluding buildings and furnishings from valuation for state 
compensation since they were already provided by the state itself or, 
in other words, were a product of the state's use of the land. The board 
would have extended this principle to include improvements as well 
as buildings. However, the Court rejected such an extension because, 
even though "logically consistent," it conflicts with the statutory policy 
of reimbursement for lost taxes. 
The Legislature, in excluding buildings from the commission-
er's valuation, has made a policy decision that the reimbursement 
shall not be fully compensatory. But we think that, within the 
limits of reimbursement set by the exclusion of buildings, the 
statutory purpose is best fulfilled by making that reimbursement 
compensatory so far as possible. It follows that "land" must be in-
terpreted to include improvements.D 
§24.5. Officers, agents and employees. During the 1970 SuRvEY 
year the Supreme Judicial Court wrote two decisions disposing of pe-
titions for mandamus brought by would-be local officials to compel 
their own appointment. 
In the first, Montanari v. Director of Civil Service} the Court ex-
6 G.L., c. 4, §6, (Third Rule). 
7 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 783-785, 258 N.E.2d 539, 541-543. 
8 343 Mass. 223, 178 N.E.2d 10 (1961). 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 781, 786, 258 N.E.2d 539, 543. 
§24.5. 1356 Mass. 514, 254 N.E.2d 255 (1969). 
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amined the application of civil service •• regulations _to high-ranking 
municipal appointees. The petitioner sought to compel the respon~ 
dent director to authorize the appointment or_ employment of the pe-
titioner as personnel director of the city of Springfield-and to authorize 
his compensation,2 The petition was dismissed in Superior Court. 
The petitioner had been appointed personnel director by the mayor 
in 1964. In 1965 the director of civil service notified the city of his 
opinion that petitioner's appointment violated G.L., c. 31,- §5, and 
the civil service rules, exempting specific enumerated positions from 
Civil Service Commission rules and including within that exemption 
"heads of municipal departments" not expressly subjected to civil ser-
vice rules by statute. The petitioner claimed exemption from civil 
service rules by reason of inclusion in Section 5 as a "head of a prin-
cipal department of the city." 
To determine the personnel director's status, the Court examined 
the city's Revised Ordinances allocating powers and duties within the 
personnel department between the _personnel director and the Per-
sonnel Policy Board. The ordinances committed policy-making au-
thority to the board, and administrative and supervisory functions to 
the director as a subordinate arm of the board. Consequently the di~ 
rector could not qualify as a departmental "head" exempt from the 
operation of the civil service laws. Still, the ambiguity of that statu-
tory term seems likely to generate_ continued litigation in analogous 
municipal bureaucracies. 
The more substantial case involving municipal officers was Starr v. 
Board of Health of Clinton,s in which the Supreme Judicial Court 
confirmed the town health board's wariness ·of a conflict-of-interest 
violation lurking in the appointment of one of its own members to a 
local inspector's post. Again by- mandamus, the petitioner sought to 
compel the Board of Health "to appoint and certify ... [the] peti-
tioner to the office of Plumbing Inspector of the Town of Clinton." 
The petition was dismissed in the Superior Court_. The decision of the 
Supreme Judicial Court confirms an earlier interpretation of the con-
flict-of-interest statute and strikes tangentially upon local discretion 
to override the veterans preference policies of civil service regulations. 
While still a member of the Board of Health, the petitioner took 
the civil service qualifying examination for the position of plumbing 
2 Petitioner sought mandamus under G.L., c. 31, §39: "Any person found by the 
director to be illegally appointed or employed may file a petition for a writ of 
mandamus in the supreme judicial or superior court to compel the director to 
authorize such appointment or employment, and the payment of compensation or 
salary therefor. At any time after the petition is filed the ci>urt, if of opinion that 
there is reasonable doubt whether the appointment or employment of such person 
is in violation of the civil service law or rules, may order that the compensation 
accruing to such person for services actually rendered shall be paid to him until 
otherwise ordered by said court." 
3 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1309, 252 N.E.2d 89!1. 
9
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inspector. He passed and was placed number one on the civil service 
list because of his status as a disabled veteran. At subsequent meetings 
of the board, he moved that it appoint a plumbing inspector. Other 
members of the board sought the opinion of town counsel on the pos-
sibility of conflict of interest· in the appointment of the petitioner. 
Town counsel viewed both petitioner's membership on the board and 
his ownership of a retail plumbing supply business as conflicts of in-
terest barring his appointment.4 
Nevertheless the petitioner's zeal for public service continued un-
abated. In an effort to eliminate his disqualifications he first sold his 
plumbing supply business to his brother for the nominal sum of one 
dollar, and ultimately tendered his resignation from the board. Still 
wary, the board continued to demur to his appointment. 
Affirming the dismissal of the petition, the Supreme Judicial Court 
drew three conclusions. First, so long as the petitioner had remained 
a board member he could not, under the controlling statute, be ap-
pointed plumbing inspector.5 
Second, in response to the contention that petitioner's plumbing 
supply business did not create a conflict because "[t]he appointed job 
deals with inspecting plumbers' work ... [and the] supply business 
deals with the public on retail sales," the Court reiterated its forceful 
construction of the conflict-of-interest statute as intended "as much 
to prevent giving the appearance of conflict as to suppress all tendency 
of wrongdoing."6 The. petitioner's thinly veiled interest in a plumbing 
supply business during his service as a plumbing inspector would ob-
viously have created a prohibited "appearance" of conflict of interest. 
Third, and finally, the Court defined generously the discretionary 
power of a local appointing authority to subordinate the veterans 
preference policy embodied in G.L., c. 31, §23, to the public interest 
in qualified appointments. 
. . . [U]nder §23 an appointing authority has the power and 
duty to protect the public interest in having only public officers 
and employees of good character and integrity and may refrain 
from appointing a disabled veteran in preference to others where 
there are reasonable grounds to regard that veteran's character 
or past conduct as rendering him unfit and unsuitable to perform 
the duties of office.7 
4 Several specific statutory provisions support this view. Under G.L., c. 41, §4A, 
a town board is authorized to .appoint one of its own members to another town 
position only by an express statutory provision or a "vote of the town." Also, G.L., 
c. 268A, §21A (enacted after the events of the main case), similarly prohibits such 
appointments without prior approval at an annual town meeting. 
5 G.L., c. 41, §4A. 
6 Board of Selectmen of Avon v. Linder, 352 Mass. 581, 583, 227 N.E.2d 359, 360 
(1967). The Starr Court viewed G.L., c. 268A, broadly as "the conflict of interest 
law." 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1309, 1311 n,3, 252 N.E.2d 893, 895 n.3. 
7 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1309, 1313, 252 N.E.2d 893, 896. This language appeared 
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This reaffirmed language would now seem available to local ap-
pointing bodies as a valuable authorization at least to avoid demon-
strably inferior appointments formerly thought inevitable under the 
veterans preference rule. 
§24.6. Collective bargaining. In Chief of Police v. Town of 
Dracut/ the year's major decision involving municipal collective bar-
gaining power, the Court, through Justice Quirico, sought to delineate 
statutory distributions of administrative power and collective bargain-
ing authority between the municipal chief of police and the board of 
selectmen, respectively. The chief had brought a suit in equity to have 
his proper powers declared after the board had, in his view, collec-
tively bargained away as "wages, hours and other conditions of em-
ployment" the departmental regulatory powers reserved to him as chief 
of police. 
The conflicting sources of statutory authority required close read-
ing. In 1955 the town of Dracut had accepted G.L., c. 41, §97A,2 pro-
viding for the appointment by the selectmen of a chief of police 
empowered "from time to time [to] make suitable regulations govern-
ing the police department, and the officers thereof, subject to the ap" 
proval of the selectmen; [but] ... effective without such approval 
upon the failure of the selectmen to take action thereon within thirty 
days of their submission by the chief of police." Moreover, "[t]he chief 
of police ... shall be in immediate control ... of the police officers, 
whom he shall assign to their respective duties and who shall obey 
his orders." 
Meanwhile the collective bargaining power of the board of select-
originally in Commissioner of the Metropolitan Dist. Colrimn. v. Director of Civil 
Serv., 348 Mass. 184, 193, 203 N.E.2d 95, 101 (1964). 
§24.6. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531. 
2 In full, Section 97 A provides as follows: "In any town which accepts this 
section there shall be a police department established by the selectmen, and such 
department shall be under the supervision of an officer to be known. as the chief 
of police. The selectmen of any such town shall appoint a chief of police and such 
other officers as they deem necessary, and fix their compensation, not exceeding, in 
the aggregate, the annual appropriation therefor. In any such town in which such 
appointments are not subject to chapter thirty-one, they shall be made annually 
and the selectmen may remove such chief or other officers for cause at any time 
after a hearing. The chief of police in any such town shall from time to time make 
suitable regulations governing the police department, and the officers thereof, sub-
ject to the approval of the selectmen; provided, that such regulations shall become 
effective without such approval upon the failure of the selectmen to take action 
thereon within thirty days after they have been submitted to them by the chief of 
police. The chief of police in any such town shall be in immediate control of all 
town property used by the department, and of the police officers, whom he shall 
assign to their respective duties and who shall obey his orders. Section ninety-seven 
shall not apply in any town which accepts the provisions of this section. Acceptance 
of the provisions of this section shall be by a vote at an annual town meeting." 
A preliminary issue resolved by the Court was the board's contention that Section 
97A had been repealed by the town's proper exercise of home rule power. See §24.8 
infra. 
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ment derived from G.L., c. 149, §§l78G-178N, under which they alone, 
acting as the "chief executive officer[s]" of the municipal employer 
are empowered to conduct collective bargaining negotiations with town 
employees, including members of the police department, with regard 
to "wages, hours and other conditions of employment." (Emphasis 
added.)3 The selectmen alone had authority to "execute a written con-
tract incorporating any agreement reached." Section 1781, conferring 
this authority, provides that in the event "that any part or provision 
of any such agreement is in conflict with any law, ordinance or by-law, 
such law, ordinance or by-law shall prevail so long as such conflict re-
mains." 
The Court noted that since the trial of the Dracut case, Section 1781 
had been amended by the insertion of language providing that "the 
provisions of any such agreement shall prevail over any regulation 
made by a chief of police"4 pursuant to Section 97A of Chapter 41. 
However, observed the Court in a footnote, 5 this amendment did not 
affect the present case "because the record does not show that there 
are any regulations made by the chief of police pursuant to §97 A now 
in effect. It does not appear whether the chief has ever made any such 
regulations, nor does it appear whether regulations, if any, made by 
him have been disapproved by the selectmen." Thus no concrete con-
flict between the selectmen's collective bargaining agreement and any 
specific regulation of the chief had arisen. Still the chief's power to 
make such regulations remained at issue, and a declaration of that 
power required a definition of the board's proper range of collective 
bargaining authority. 
An accommodation of the two enabling statutes and a consistent 
distribution of authority between the chief and selectmen turned on 
the language of Section 1781, authorizing the board to negotiate and 
contract on the subject matter of "wages, hours and other conditions 
of employment." In this instance the Court ruled that the board's con-
tract had exceeded this subject matter and infringed on the depart-
mental powers of the chief. 
Especially with regard to the assignment of police personnel, the 
Court sought to carve out a sphere of administrative discretion for the 
chief. "Most of the disputed articles require that the chief give exclu-
sive consideration to the individual requests, personal preference, se-
niority and rank of a police officer in determining assignment of duties, 
shifts, vacations and leaves of absence." (Emphasis added.)6 The Court 
continued: 
The paramount concern of the chief in assigning his officers to 
3 G.L., c. 149, §1781. 
4 Acts of 1969, c. 341. 
5 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 774 n.3, 258 N.E.2d 531, 535 n.3. 
6 Id. at 776, 258 N.E.2d at 536. See id. n.4 for the text of these articles. These 
provisions appear to hamstring the chief in an intricate seniority tangle. 
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their respective duties must be the interest and safety of the pub-
lic, and, to some degree, the safety of the officers themselves, not 
the personal preference of each officer. In making assignments the 
chief must exercise his own discretion and judgment as to the 
number, qualifications and identity of officers needed for partic-
ular situations at any given time. He clearly has been given that 
authority by §97 A, and we cannot believe that the Legislature, in 
enacting provisions for collective bargaining by municipal em-
ployees, meant to take that authority away from the chief and 
permit the selectmen to bargain it away under the guise of nego-
tiations on "wages, hours and other conditions of employment." 
To deprive the chief of his authority to assign his officers to their 
respective duties and to substitute therefor the disputed provi-
sions of the agreement would be totally subversive of the disci-
pline and efficiency which is indispensable to a public law 
enforcement agency.7 
Thus certain articles of the contract fell because the selectmen had 
acted beyond the scope of "wages, hours and other conditions of em-
ployment." 
Still other provisions of the agreement were held void because they 
conflicted with provisions of the General Laws and had to yield under 
Section 1781. These included an article calling for the rules and regu-
lations of the chief to be approved by the board apparently in every 
instance, and therefore in violation of Section 97A's permissive effec-
tuation of the chief's rules in certain instances without the board's 
approval. Also void was an article compelling the inclusion of weapons 
as a part of a uniform requirement and therefore violating a separate 
statutory assignment of weapons carriage decisions to the chief's judg-
ment. 
The Court deemed other contested articles of agreement to be 
within the legitimate collective bargaining power of the selectmen, in-
cluding (a) a provision for personnel time-keeping records to be kept 
and made available to the officers' association by the chief; (b) provi-
sions controlling leaves of absence without pay, their length and fre-
quency; (c) and provisions for grievance procedures for complaints 
arising out of the collective bargaining agreement itself, but not for 
grievances arising froin any exercise of discretionary authority by the 
chief under Section 97 A. 
§24.7. By-laws and ordinances. The 1970 SuRvEY year produced 
two decisions worth mention in the area of municipal by-laws and or-
dinances. 
The first of these deals with the attorney general's power of ap-
proval over local by-laws and ordinances1 and the proper use of man-
7 ld. at 777, 258 N.E.2d at 5!17. 
§24.7. 1 G.L., c. 40, §!12. 
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damus by local authorities to controvert a decision of disapproval. 
Senkarik v. Attorney Genera/2 grew .out of the attempt of the town of 
Uxbridge to adopt an amendment to its zoning by-law to authorize 
the zoning board of appeals to grant a permit for construction of apart-
ment houses anywhere in town. The board was to be required merely 
to consider the effects of a permit on the neighborhood and town at 
large. 
The attorney general subsequently disapproved the amendment as 
an authorization of spot zoning in violation of statutory3 and deci-
sional law.4 The petitioner, a taxpayer and landowner of the town, 
brought a petition for a writ of mandamus against the attorney gen· 
eral on the ground that his disapproval was unreasonable, arbitrary 
and capricious, and prayed that the disapproval be quashed. 
The Court affirmed the denial of this petition in the Superior Court, 
and reaffirmed the rule, equally forceful in the setting of municipal 
by-laws, that mandamus cannot be used to review a purely legal de-
termination thought to be erroneous.5 Mandamus would have been 
appropriate only for the contention that the attorney general had 
failed to carry out a statutory duty by failure to act on the town's re-
quest for approvaLs Instead, the "argument is that the Attorney Gen-
eral has acted but did so incorrectly, and he seeks in substance a 
review of the decision."7 For this reason alone the petition was cor-
rectly denied, and the petitioner not entitled to relief by mandamus. 
As a proper use of mandamus to rectify an unauthorized disapproval 
of an amendment of a zoning by-law by the attorney general, the 
Court adverted to the continuing vitality of Concord v. Attorney Gen· 
era/,8 where the attorney general's disapproval had not been based on 
legal grounds.9 
The year's other notable decision involving municipal authority to 
enact by-laws also originated with a petition for a writ of mandamus, 
brought by a group of residents of the town of Hopkinton against 
its board of selectmen and a local sand and stone company. In Good-
win v. Board of Selectmen of Hopkinton 10 the petitioning residents 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 457, 257 N.E.2d 470. 
3 G.L., c. 40A, §2. 
4 Smith v. Board of Appeals of Fall River, 319 Mass. 341, 65 N.E.2d 547 (1946) 
(invalidating spot zoning). 
5 Ames v. Attorney General, 332 Mass. 246, 124 N.E.2d 511 (1955); Howe v. 
Attorney General, 325 Mass. 268, 90 N.E.2d 316 (1950). 
6 As the Court noted, this event would be unlikely since, under G.L., c. 40, §32, 
a by-law may become effective if the attorney general fails to act reasonably on a 
request for approval. 
7 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 457, 458, 257 N.E.2d 470, 471. 
8 336 Mass. 17, 142 N.E.2d 360 (1957). In that case the attorney general failed to 
perform a statutory duty to attach reasons for his disapproval of a zoning by-law. 
9 The Court noted, gratuitously, that the attorney general's disapproval in the 
instant case was correct in law since the contested by-law did contravene the 
decision of Smith v. Fall River, note 4 supra. 
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1277, 261 N.E.2d 60. 
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sought a writ ordering the selectmen to revoke an earth removal per-
mit which they had issued to the company. The petition was dismissed 
in the Superior Court. 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the dismissal. The significance 
of the decision lies in Justice Quirico's instructive discussion of the 
relationship of the two statutes enabling local by-laws in regulation of 
earth removal. 
First, under the zoning enabling statute, Chapter 40A of the Gen-
eral Laws, municipalities may, by zoning by-laws or ordinances, regu-
late the use of land and thereby control or prohibit the sale of loam, 
sand, gravel, stone or other "component parts" of land.ll At first this 
statute was the only source of municipal authority to regulate the re-
moval of material from land. Only a zoning ordinance or by-law could 
achieve the desired regulation.12 
An alternate source of local regulatory power arose in 1949 with 
G.L., c. 40, §21, cl. 17. In pertinent part, it authorized a municipality 
to adopt a by-law or ordinance "(f]or prohibiting or regulating the 
removal of soil, loam, sand or gravel from land not in public use in 
the whole or in specified districts of the (city or] town." Municipalities 
now have the option to proceed under the Zoning Enabling Act or 
under Clause 17. 
In practice the two statutes are not necessarily redundant. The Court 
has previously pointed out that "[t]he purpose of the 1949 amendment 
to the statute was to enable municipalities to regulate [earth removal] 
without setting up any zoning system."13 Nor is a municipality limited 
exClusively to one type of ordinance or by-law. It may regulate the 
removal of materials from land by both a zoning ordinance or by-law 
and a separate ordinance or by-law derived from Clause 17 to ac-
complish its legitimate desire, as noted in Goodwin, "to avoid the 
involved and strict procedural requirements for adopting or amending 
zoning ordinances and by-laws."14 Thus Clause 17 is available equally 
to municipalities with and without zoning ordinances and by-laws. 
By this statutory analysis the Court disentangled the Hopkinton 
dispute arising from the town's simultaneous adoption of a zoning by-
law and an independent earth removal by-law. The sand and stone 
company had received its permit under, and was conducting its 
removal operations in accordance with, the earth removal by-law. The 
petitioning residents contended that the removal operations violated 
the zoning by-laws. The earth removal by-law included language dis-
11 See, e.g., Raimondo v. Board of Appeals of Bedford, !1!11 Mass. 228, 2!10, I 18 
N.E.2d 67, 68 (1954); Seekonk v. John J. McHale &: Sons, Inc., !125 Mass. 271, 274, 90 
N.E.2d !125, !127 (1950); Billerica v. Quinn, !120 Mass. 687, 690, 71 N.E.2d 2!15, 236 
(1947). 
·12 North Reading v. Drinkwater, !109 Mass. 200, !14 N.E.2d 6!11 (1941). 
13 Butler v. East Bridgewater, !1!10 Mass. !1!1, !16, 110 N.E.2d 922, 924 (1953). 
14 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1277, 1282-1283, 261 N.E.2d 60, 64. The requirements 
justifying avoidance arise from G.L., c. !19, §15, id. i:. 40A, §§6-7, and id. c. 4!1, §18. 
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avowing any effect "to amend, repeal or supersede the Zoning By~ 
Laws." Nevertheless, reading the by-laws as a consistent scheme adopted 
at the .same town meeting, the Court found ample language for the 
conclusion that the Clause 17 by-law was intended to occupy the field 
of earth removal to the exclusion of the zoning provisions. 
More significantly, the separate and controlling force of specific 
earth removal by-laws over general zoning ordinances seems more 
firmly established in light of the former's independent source under 
Clause 17. Ambiguity in interlocking zoning and removal by-laws 
seems likely to be resolved in favor of Clause 17. And, most significantly, 
towns intending a clear and independent earth removal by-law seem 
well advised to act expressly under the authorization of Clause 17 
and, so far as possible, to steer clear of entanglement with zoning 
ordinances. 
§24.8. Home Rule Amendment. Interpretation of the municipal 
lawmaking power conferred by the Home Rule Amendment1 proved 
crucial in two significant decisions during the 1970 SuRVEY year: one 
in the context of municipal collective bargaining power and the other 
in a test of a local rent control power. · 
In the instance of municipal collective bargaining, Chief of Police 
v. Town of Dracut,2 statutes enabling the town selectmen to perform 
collective bargaining and the chief of police to administer the depart-
ment came into conflict.3 Under G.L., c. 41, §97A, Dracut accepted the, 
provisions of that statute by vote at an annual town meeting in 1955. 
At a town meeting in 1967 it was voted that the town rescind the pro-
visions of Section 97A and substitute those of Section 97 of the same 
chapter, under which regulation of the department and its officers was 
committed to the selectmen and not to the police chief. This adoption, 
coming during collective bargainjng negotiations by the selectmen, 
was apparently intended to obviate the alleged infringement by that 
bargain upon the regulatory discretion of the chief. 
The town claimed authority for such rescission and substitution 
under the Home Rule Amendment. Prior to the amendment, the 
controlling law had been stated in the 1959 decision of Brucato v. 
Lawrence: 
.. . .. In the absence ... of some indication in the language, the 
· form, or the subject matter of a particular statute ·enacted subject 
to local acceptance, that an acceptance once given may be revoked, 
the effect of a valid acceptance by a city or town is to make the 
statute operative in that community until the statute is repealed 
§24.8. 1 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531. For the collective bargaining signifi-
cance of this case see §24.6 supra. See also the student comment on the interpreta-
tion of the Home Rule Amendment in the Dracut case, §24.20 infra. 
3 G.L., c. 149, §§178G·l78N, inserted by ~cts tlf 1965, c. 763, §2, ,and amended 
through Acts of 1969, c. 841; and G.L., cc. 41, 97A, amended by Acts, of 1~4~, c. 595. 
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or amended. Once the condition precedent stipulated by the Legis-
lature to the taking effect of the statute in the community is satis-
fied, it becomes applicable statute law, subject to change, as in the 
case of other statutes, only by subsequent action of the Legislature.4 
The issue for the Court in the Dracut case was whether the Home 
Rule Amendment had overridden the rule of Brucato v. Lawrence. 
Section 8 of the amendment provides that "[tJhe general court shall 
have the power to act in relation to cities and towns, but only by 
general laws which apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all 
cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two . . . ." Crucial 
language appears in Section 6 of the Home Rule Amendment, provid-
ing in part: 
Any city or town may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of 
local ordinances or by·laws exercise any power or function which 
the general court has power to confer upon it, which is not in-
consistent with the constitution or laws enacted by the general 
court in conformity with powers reserved to the general court by 
section eight .... [Emphasis added.] 
The Home Rule Procedures Act, passed to implement the amend-
ment, amplifies this language. Section 13 of the act repeats the lan-
guage of Section 6 of the amendment, and provides additionally that: 
Nothing in this section shall be construed to permit any city or 
town, by ordinance or by-law, to exercise any power or function 
which is inconsistent with any general law enacted by the general 
court before [the ratification of the amendment] which applies 
alike to all cities, or to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a 
class not fewer than two. 5 
The Court held Section 97A, vesting departmental authority in the 
police chief, to be such a general law. The fact that a town has the 
original option whether or not to adopt a statute does not change its 
character as a general law once adopted. Section 97 A therefore fell 
within the powers reserved to the General Court by the Home Rule 
Amendment and by the Home Rule Procedures Act. The latter in-
cludes no grant of authority to municipalities to rescind by unilateral 
action their prior acceptance of any provision of the General Laws. 
To the Court that omission may well reflect "the Legislature's concern 
that if municipalities had unbridled authority to rescind prior ac-
ceptance of basic provisions of the General Laws by unilateral action, 
there might result frequent and precipitous changes in the administra-
tion of municipal affairs which might produce chaos, all contrary to 
4338 Mass. 612, 615-616, 156 N.E.2d 676, 679 (1959). 
II G.L;, c. 4SB, §l!l. 
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the public interest."6 Consequently the rule of Brucato v. Lawrence 
remains intact. A town vote to rescind a previous acceptance of a 
general law is a nullity. 
Perhaps the year's most significant municipal law decision was the 
Court's invalidation of the Brookline rent contrpl by4aw as exceeding 
the local legislative power conferred by the Home Rule Amendment. 
The decision turned on the Court's construction of Article 89, Section 
7(5), as applied to rent regulation. Section 7(5) declares that no provi-
sion of the amendment authorizes any town " .. , (~).to enact private 
or civil law governing civil relationships except as incident to an 
exercise of an independent municipal power." The Court held rent 
control to constitute such a private or civ!llaw not clearly incident to 
an exercise of independent municipal power. In . the course of the 
opinion, it grappled at length with the langu(lge of Subsection (5) 
before it applied a restrictive interpretation and invited clarification 
by an express legislative delegation of the power to emict ·rent control. 
The legislature was quick to accept this invitation in the case of Brook-
line.7 
The Court's holding in Marshal House, I.nc. v. ·Rent Review & 
Grievance Board of Brookline8 foreclosed the Home Rule Amendment 
as a source of local rent control enactments and spurred enabling legis-
lation on rent control in lieu of the amendment. The plaintiff, owner 
of more than ten housing units in Brookline; sought declaratory relief 
against the Rent Review Board and the town itself from Article XXV 
of the town by-laws.9 The controversy arose specifically from the in-
formationrequirement provision of Section 3(£) of the by-law, authoriz-
ing the board to require of landlords, no more than once a year, a 
detailed account of their rental activity.1o 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 773, 258 N.E.2d 531, 534. 
7 Chapter 843 of the Acts of 1970 authorizes Brookline to adopt rent control; 
Chapter 863 similarly authorizes Boston; and Chapter 842 provides a general 
enabling act. These statutes are outlined in §24.18 infra. 
s 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 260 N.E.2d 200. 
o "Unfair and Unreasonable Rental P.racticeS in .Housing Accommodations." The 
by-law declared the existence of public emergency in housing because of insufficient 
low and moderate income rental housing ·accommodations, and · established a rent 
review and grievance board empowered to investigate complaints of unfair rental 
practices and to order their cessation, to issue other just and proper orders, includ-
ing the order that the landlord not receive rent in excess of an amount determined 
by the board to be "fair and reasonable under the circumstances." The board 
possessed the adjudicative power to receive complaints and review proposed rent 
increases. 
10 All landlords holding more than 10 housing units were required to file a form 
showing (1) the rent for each unit, (2) the number of rooms per unit, and (3) whether 
each. tenancy was held by written lease. Also, a form to be filed under penalty of 
perjury required the address of each building, its date of ·Construction or last 
substantial renovation, its date of acquisition, the number of floors and rentable 
units, the utilities supplied without charge; and, for each apartment, its number, 
size, monthly rent, lease expiration date; term of lease; existence of tax clause, park-
ing provided, and type of occupancy. 
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The town and the board, joined by the attorney general, grounded 
the by-law on the Home Rule Amendment and contended specifically: 
(I) that art. 89, Section 6 conferred broad legislative power on the 
town, subject only to the legislature's power to supersede local legisla-
tion by general laws; (2) that the powers flowing from Section 6 alone 
included the power to adopt a rent control by-law; and (3) that Section 
7(5) did not limit the power granted to the town by Section 6. 
On its face, Section 6 does grant ample powers to cities and towns: 
Any ... town may, by the adoption ... of local ... by-laws, 
exercise any power ... which the general court has power to confer 
upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitution or laws 
enacted by the general court in conformity with the powers re-
served to the general court by section eight [defining certain 
powers reserved exclusively to the legislature] and which is not 
denied ... to ... the town by its charter .... [Emphasis added.] 
Section 7 .follows quickly to limit much of the generosity of Section 6. 
Most of the former section's restricting subsections cover relatively 
specific matters,U but Subsection (5) contrasts in its generality for-
bidding municipalities "to enact private or civil law governing civil 
relationships except as an incident to an exercise of an independent 
municipal power." 
The Court sought in vain for authoritative clarification of Subsec-
tion (5) both in its legislative history12 and in municipal law com-
mentary.13 It did not doubt the legislature's police power to regulate 
rents directly or the authority of the legislature to make an express 
delegation of such power to the municipalities. However, municipal 
rent control on the authority of the Home Rule Amendment fell 
within neither class of power, and it remained for the Court to deter-
11 E.g., a town's power (1) to regulate elections, (2) to levy taxes, (3) to borrow 
money or pledge the town's credit, (4) to dispose of parkland and (5) to enact 
criminal law. 
12 1965 Senate Doc. No. 950, at 9, 21, 114, 131; 1966 Senate Doc. No. 846, at 20. 
13 American Municipal Assn., Model Constitutional Provisions for Municipal 
Home Rule (1953); Fordham, Home Rule- AMA Model, 44 Natl. Municipal Rev. 
137, 142 (1955); Gere and Curran, Home Rule pt. II, c. IV, The Constitutional 
Grant of Home Rule 33 (1969); Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power Under 
Home Rule: A Role for the Courts, 48 Minn. L. Rev. 643, 674-679 (1964). 
The Court' adverted especially to the views of Prof. Sandalow and observed by 
footnote that the commentator construed the language to require both the 
existence and exercise of an independent municipal power, with emphasis on the 
independence of the municipal power from any control over purely civil or private 
relationships. The power itself must be of an independently public character, and 
its private extenuations merely and genuinely incidental. In this light, the Court 
noted the tendency· of the town to characterize rent regulation as an independent 
municipal power per se. But the definitional problem remains, "because whatever 
policy the town has attempted to carry out is (under the by-law) to be executed by 
the direct regulation of :the civil relationship between landlord and tenant." 1970 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 1035 n.4, 260 N.E.2d 200, 204 n.4;_. 
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mine whether such rent regulation could stand as a private law "in-
cident to an exercise of an independent municipal power."14 While 
the Court conceded the obvious broad public welfare purpose of rent 
control, it distinguished rent regulation as less than the necessary inde-
pendent municipal power. Rent control was simply too direct an 
intervention in the continuing private landlord-tenant relationship. 
Its public purpose did not of itself create an independent public 
power. It remained an essentially civil law, remaking the parties' 
private contract of tenancy. 
Nor could the Court accommodate rent control as an exercise of 
traditionally recognized local police powers. The phrase "independent 
municipal power" implied to the Court various separate component 
powers constituting the entire local police power. It required that such 
a specific discreet component, such as traffic control or fire protection, 
be identified as the necessary independent power. The amorphous 
entirety of local police powers could not itself constitute the required 
independent power, or else that requirement could be met so easily as 
to be meaningless. 
The Court concluded that Section 7 (5) prevents the adoption of 
local rent control by-laws in the absence of an explicit legislative dele-
gation of the rent control power to the municipalities. The legislature 
has now delegated that power to specific municipalities15 and, more 
generally, under Chapter 842 of the Acts of 1970, to any city or town 
with a population of 50,000 or more adopting the provisions of that 
statute. Coming challenges to local rent control will undoubtedly shift 
the attack to this enabling legislation and to the impact of particular 
local enactments. 
§24.9. Counties. The least visible unit of local government made 
two noteworthy appearances in the pages of the 1970 SuRvEY year's 
reports. In one case county residents sought to compel an improvement 
in county facilities; in the other they sought a redistribution of county 
taxation; in both instances they failed. 
Mcintyre v. County Commissioners of Bristo/1 originated with the 
14 The town pressed strenuously, but unsuccessfully, for this view. "In this case, 
of course, the 'independent municipal power' which the town is exercising is a 
portion of the police power- namely the power to regulate rent levels in the 
public interest. [Citing Russell v. Treasurer and Receiver General, 331 Mass. 501, 
507, 120 N.E.2d 388, 391-392 (1954)]. This power is conferred on the town by virtue 
of section 6 of the Home Rule Amendment. It can be taken away from the town 
by general law, but unless it is, it is an 'independent municipal power.' 'As an 
incident' to the exercise of this independent municipal power the town may enact 
private or civil law." (Footnote omitted.) Brief for Respondents at 43-44. 
15 To Brookline by Chapter 843 of the Acts of 1970; to Boston by Chapter 863. As 
of this writing, Cambridge and Somerville have adopted rent control, and other 
municipalities are expected to follow suit under the broad authorization of 
Chapter 842. Chapters 842, 843 and 863 are outlined in §24.18 infra. 
§24.9. 1 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1429, 254 N.E.2d 242. 
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petition of 20 resident attorneys for a writ of mandamus to compel the 
county commissioners to select a new courthouse site, to have plans and 
specifications prepared, and to take other steps to "provide adequate 
and suitable facilities and accommodations" in that county for the 
Superior Court. The petitioners alleged the inadequacy of the existing 
courthouse facilities and contended that the commissioners were 
charged by statute2 with a duty to provide suitable courthouses, and 
that they had failed to exercise other statutory authority to remedy 
existing courthouse inadequacies.s 
Twelve attorneys intervened to oppose the petition. Several filed 
demurrers on the ground that the petitioning attorneys sought to 
require the commissioners to perform a discretionary act. 
The Superior Court judge overruled the demurrers, heard evidence, 
took judicial notice of specified facts, received certain stipulations of 
fact, and made detailed findings. His order for judgment directed the 
commissioners "with all practicable speed ... to take all steps and 
measures which are lawfully available to them to provide court house 
facilities for [the] Superior Court and [the] Probate Court which are 
suitable in all necessary characteristics, including but not limited to" 
16 types of facilities.4 
The petitioners invoked several statutes. Under Chapter 393 of the 
Acts of 1966 the commissioners "were given permission and authority 
to construct a new court house for the Superior and Probate Courts." 
Petitioners argued that this "legislative recognition" of inadequate 
facilities had not moved the commissioners to carry out the legislative 
authorization. In fact, in 1967 they had voted against the construction 
of a new centralized courthouse. However, the Supreme Judicial Court 
found that the trial judge had ruled correctly that Chapter 393 was 
merely permissive and imposed no legal duty on the commissioners. 
Instead, the trial court had relied on G.L., c. 34, §3, providing in 
part that "[e]ach county shall provide suitable court houses ... and 
other public buildings necessary for its use. . . ." It found that this 
mandatory language did impose the requisite legal duty upon the com-
missioners. 
Though in sympathy with the trial judge's findings of fact, the 
Supreme Judicial Court held that the demurrers should have been 
sustained. The acts sought of the commissioners were not sufficiently 
2 G.L., c. 34, §§3, 14~ Section 3 provides that "[e]ach county shall provide suitable 
court houses. . . ." Section 14 provides that "the commissioners may provide for 
erecting and repairing court houses .... " (Emphasis added.) 
3 Acts of 1966, c. 393, "An Act authorizing the county commissioners of Bristol 
County to construct a new building for the courts and various departments of said 
county." (Emphasis added.) 
4 The facilities included adequate courtrooms, judges' lobbies, jury rooms, cus-
todial quarters, grand jury facilities, conference rooms, hearing rooms for masters 
and auditors, stenographers' rooms, county legal officers' quarters. waiting rooms 
and lavatories, parking spaces, and. a library.' · 
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specific in the petition or in the lower order for judgment. The Court 
could discover no failure to perform a specific public trust or duty, 
but merely the direction to perform general statutory duties. The 
statutes involved provided only a wide range of permissible and 
largely discretionary action for improvement of existing facilities. 
In dicta the Court suggested that the commissioners, with the as-
sistance of the local bar, examine and undertake the variety of mea-
sures available for improvement. While feasible expense would have 
to be weighed, the lower court's findings provided a starting point for 
renovation. At the same time the Court reminded the commissioners 
of their duty under G.L., c. 34, §31 at least "promptly to consider and 
decide" remedies, and for this purpose offered the assistance of the 
executive secretary of the Supreme Judicial Court. 
Thus the Court substituted its administrative exhortation for the 
compulsion of mandamus. The genuine lawmaking case, involving the 
Court's powers of judicial administration, might still arise if, as the 
Court speculates in conclusion, "the county commissioners fail to take 
appropriate and adequate action within a reasonable time."" 
The year's other significant decision, Thompson v. City of Che1seaJ6 
originated from a broadsided bill for declaratory relie£7 brought by 17 
taxable inhabitants of Boston against (I) the cities of Boston, Chelsea, 
Revere, and the town of Winthrop; (2) Suffolk County; (3) the indi-
viduals in Boston (the mayor and city council), Chelsea (the aldermen), 
Revere (the city council) and Winthrop (the selectmen) who serve as 
county commissioners of Suffolk County in their respective communi-
ties;8 and (4) the Collector-Treasurer of Boston and Suffolk County.9 
Since the enactment of Chapter 109 of the Acts of 1821, the costs of 
administering the county government of Suffolk County have been 
carried entirely by Boston. The provision currently governing taxes for 
Suffolk County is Section 52, Chapter 490 of the Acts of 1909: 
In ... Boston all taxes assessed for county or city purposes may 
be assessed separately as county taxes and as city taxes, or under 
the name of city taxes only, as the city council shall direct. The 
city of Chelsea and the towns of Revere and Winthrop shall not 
be taxed for county purposes. 
Unhappy with the bare conclusory allegations of unconstitutionality 
of the taxing scheme under the Massachusetts Constitution1° and the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal Constitution, the Court read 
the bill to allege in substance (a) that the taxes of the individual plain-
5 1969 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1429, 1435, 254 N.E.2d 242, 246. 
61970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087, 260 N.E.2d 699. 
7 The bill was brought also under G.L., c. 40, §53. 
s See G.L., c. 34, §4. 
9 The Superior Court judge sustained demurrers and reported the case to the 
Supreme Judicial Court. 
10 Part II, c. 1, §1, art. 4, and arts. I, 10-12 and 29 of the Declaration of Rights. 
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tiffs as r~sidei1t taxpayers of Boston would be increased by the con• 
tinued operation of the 1909 statutory exemption of Chelsea, Revere 
and Winthrop from courity taxes, and (b) that Boston would be forced 
to pay substantial county experise8 otherwise borne in -large part by 
the other three communities. 
The Court framed the issue at hand as the validity of the 1909 
statute viewed in light of the original 1821 statutory "an:angement"11 
between the then newly incorporated city of Boston and the old town 
of Chelsea as municipal antecedent of the three modern communities. 
In addition to the 1821 statute, the Court deemed certain intervening 
legislation crucially relevant, especially Chapter 65 of the Acts of 1831, 
which, inter alia, transferred ownership of all county property in old 
Chelsea to Boston.12 
Within this statutory matrix the Court, through Justice Cutter, 
found abundant, if occasionally speculative, justification for the con-
tinuing constitutionality of the present taxing arrangement. The justi-
fication reduces to two theories, The first is an implied or quasi-
contractual characterization of the still binding 1821 statutory scheme. 
The second is a more conventional application of the doctrine of the 
presumptive constitutionality of a statute whenever a rational basis for 
it is perceptible. 
The Court's notion of an implied statutory contract importing an 
1821 quid pro quo of governmental power and responsibility between 
Boston and old Chelsea serves as its- first suggested reasonable basis for 
the statute: 
By requesting the enactment of St. 1821, c. 109 Boston sought 
(a) to obtain sole and complete control of various aspects of the 
Suffolk County go.vernment, (b) to have certain county legislative 
powers placed in· the new Boston city government (§11), (c) to 
have the treasurer of Boston serve as county treasurer (§12), and 
(d) to give to the new Boston city government the sole power to 
assess county taxes (§13). The consideration for this exclusion of 
Chelsea from any significant -share in county government was the 
exemption of Chelsea by §I of St. 1821, c. 109, from all county 
taxes.13 
The 1821 statute conditioned this scheme upon acceptance by the 
voters of Boston of companion legislation making Boston a city.14 
Further reading of the 1821 and 1831 statutes suggested to the Court 
additional support for the notion of an implied. contractual arrange-
ment. The legislature may reasonably have thought that the largest 
community in the state should be a city, that it should control the 
county facilities largely within its borders, and adapt them to its 
11 See 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087 n.I, 260 N.E.2d 699, 700 n.I. 
12 See id. at 1088 n.3, 260 N.E.2d at 700-701 n.3. 
13 Id. at 1091, 260. N.E.2d at 702. 
14 St; 1821, c. 110, §31. -
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needs; that it should pay as the price for complete control the expense 
of county facilities largely in Boston and likely to increase the value 
of neighboring Boston property. Facilities in Boston would naturally 
be much more convenient to the Bostonians. And, of course, the ex-
emption may have resulted from legislative recognition of old Chelsea's 
dependence on Boston for the nature and extent of county expendi-
tures. The 1831 statute, under which old Chelsea was to transfer 
ownership and care of its county property to Boston, would seem to 
strengthen the contract theory. 
Entirely apart from notions of an implied exchange of county powers 
and duties as a reasonable basis for the statute, the Court deemed it 
impossible to say that the legislature lacked a rational basis for the 
tax exemptions of 1821 and 1909. Certain settled legislative powers 
required consideration, including the power to deal with county 
property, to alter county government and its apportionment of county 
expense, to grant tax exemptions in execution of proper public pur-
poses, to provide by special statutes for the peculiar needs of Boston, 
and, finally, to make special assessments in a specified area for partic-
ular projects for the benefit of that area. 
Consequently the Court could not characterize the 1909 statute and 
its predecessors as an arbitrary or capricious allocation of county costs. 
The legislature allowed for the original consent of the communities. 
No facts alleged presented any question that the legislature lacked 
reasonable grounds originally or that, by lapse of time and change, the 
statutory arrangement had become unconstitutional. No facts alleged, 
if proved, would establish a denial of equal protection of law by un-
reasonable classification of communities to bear county expenses. 
Such a skillful and exhaustive tour of legislative history almost 
beguiles one from the inevitable question of whether the statute is 
reasonably based today, a question to which the Court devotes com-
paratively little direct attention. Although the Court posed the ques-
tion of the tax arrangement's present constitutionality, the thrust of / 
its holding is that as originally enacted it was clearly reasonable and 
that the plaintiffs failed to allege facts to show its invalidity now. The 
gravamen of the discussion is that the county tax arrangement is 
constitutional now because it always has been so. But such points as 
that the Bostonians of 1821 consented to the statutory arrangement as 
a reasonable contract should be worth little in an assessment of the 
present constitutionality of the legislation. If the Court feels, as it 
apparently does, that the Suffolk County taxing scheme is constitu-
tionally sound today because Boston exercises exclusive power of 
control over the county facilities and should therefore bear the cor-
responding burden of expense, a more direct statement of this precise 
rationale might better have served its stated purpose of "terminating 
this litigation."15 
15 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1087, 1090, 260 N.E.2d 699, 702. 
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§24.10. Reapportionment. Massachusetts senatorial districts un-
derwent summer reapportionment during the 1970 SuRvEY year as a 
result of the Supreme Judicial Court's order in the decision of Walsh 
v. Secretary of the Commonwealth.l The decision, rendered on June 3, 
ordered the legislature to reapportion the districts in preparation for 
the 1970 election of state senators. On June 30 the legislature enacted 
a redistricting statute over the veto of the governor.2 
The suit arose as a bill for declaratory relief in equity in the Su-
preme Judicial Court, and was reserved and reported by the single 
Justice to the entire Court. The decision is a terse and forthright adop-
tion of the petitioners' arguments. In brief, stipulations and exhibits 
established that the existing apportionment of seats in the state senates 
no longer reflected, on the basis of the 1965 census, a distribution of 
seats proportional to the population of the respective senatorial dis-
tricts. In 1965, the population of the largest district (Middlesex-
Worcester) was 211,265, or 59.58 percent above the 1965 population of 
Massachusetts divided by the number of senate seats (40).4 The smallest 
district (3rd Suffolk) contained 84,366 persons, 36.28 percent below 
the 1965 norm. 
For the Court, the recent United States Supreme Court decision of 
Kirkpatrick v. Preisler5 was dispositive. There the Supreme Court had 
held that a total spread of 5.96 percent of the district norm between 
districts having the highest and the lowest populations was unconsti-
tutional. In light of Kirkpatrick, the Massachusetts Court surmised 
that 
... [i]t is highly unlikely that, if tested in the Federal courts, 
any distribution of seats in a Statewide legislative body, having 
any avoidable disparity between the district with the highest 
population and that with the lowest, will be found to satisfy 
Federal constitutional requirements, at least in the absence of 
special circumstances not suggested on this record. Cf. Swann v. 
Adams, 385 U.S. 440, 442-445 [1967].6 
For redress, the Court much preferred self-correction by the legis-
lature and declined the invitation to undertake a reapportionment 
scheme itsel£.7 The Court's approach to judicial intervention showed 
§24.10. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 853, 259 N.E.2d 768. 
2 Acts of 1970, c. 498. 
3 The existing districts had been created by Acts of 1960, c. 432, §2. 
4 This arithmetical norm would be 132,382. 
5 394 U.S. 526, 528·529, 531, 533-536 (1969), rehearing denied, 395 U.S. 917 (1969). 
6 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 853, 854, 259 N.E.2d 768, 769. 
7 The Court, was nonetheless aware of instances of judicial intervention. It noted 
Scott v. Germano, 381 U.S. 407, 409 (1965), in which the Supreme Court approved 
of the possible participation of the Illinois Supreme Court in state senatorial re-
districting, and Maryland Committee for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 377 U.S. 
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a residual adherence to the views articulated by Justice Frankfurter in 
his epic dissent in Baker v. Carr.8 The Supreme Judicial Court felt 
that 
.. [i]ntervention in matters of reapportionment, even on 
matters of constitutionality, by any court is undesirable and to be 
avoided except as a last resort (and then only to satisfy constitu-
tional mandates) .... We decline to take such action and do not 
pass upon its propriety in any event. The Legislature is still in 
session, and it remains possible that the Legislature itself will 
exercise that function, by enacting a Senate reapportionment plan.9 
§24.11. Federal-municipal relations. In the area of federal and 
local governmental relations, the 1970 SURVEY year's major decision, 
Commissioner of Labor & Industries v. Lawrence Housing Authority/ 
cleared the way for local housing authorities to engage with HUD 
in federally assisted "turnkey housing" projects. The Court expressly 
exempted those building projects from the minimum wage provisions 
of G.L., c. 149, §§26-27D2 and from the competitive bidding require-
ments of Sections 44A-44L of the same chapter.3 The enforcement of 
these provisions rested with the Commissioner of Labor and Industries. 
At the outset, Justice Kirk compactly outlined the process of 
"turnkey" low-rent public housing development. Typically, the federal 
Department of Housing and Urban Development and the local housing 
authority entered a contract under the following plan: 
... [A] developer who owns or has an option on an appropriate 
656, 676 (1964), in which the Court approved action by the Maryland courts if the 
state legislature failed to perform a timely reapportionment. 
During the course of oral argument before the Supreme Judicial Court, counsel 
mentioned several new techniques of redistricting, including the use of computers 
and of a panel of local law school deans. These novel proposals, of course, gave 
way to the traditional art of the gerrymander. 
8 369 u.s. 186, 266-330 (1962). 
9 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 853, 854, 259 N.E.2d 768, 769. The Court argued the present 
decision in Opinion of the Justices, 353 Mass. 790, 230 N.E.2d 801 (1967), where it 
indicated that Article 21 of the Amendments to the Massachusetts Constitution, 
insofar as it required an apportionment of representatives on the basis of "legal 
voters" instead of population, appeared to violate the equal protection clause of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 
§24.11. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1323, 261 N.E.2d 331. 
2 G.L., c. 121B, §§12, 29 (inserted by Acts of 1969, c. 751, §1, and formerly con-
tained in G.L., c. 121, §26T), directs the commissioner to set wage rates in accor-
dance with G.L., c. 149, §§26-27, of the several classifications of persons, including 
architects and laborers, employed in "the development or administration of a 
project." 
3 Section 44K directs the commissioner to enforce the provisions of Sections 
44A-44L, requiring competitive bidding for contracts to be awarded by govern-
mental bodies "for the construction, reconstruction, alteration, remodeling, repair 
or demolition of any public bJJilding." 
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site retains his own architect to draw preliminary plans and specifi-
cations for the construction or rehabilitation of housing units. 
The plans are submitted to the local housing authority. If the 
proposal is acceptable to the housing authority and to HUD, the 
housing authority and the developer will execute a "letter of 
intent," which sets forth the plans and a cost estimate. If the 
parties agree on a price, the developer retains a registered architect 
to prepare detailed "working" plans and specifications. '1\Then these 
have been approved by HUD, the developer and the housing au-
thority execute a contract of sale which contains provisions as to 
materials and the completion date, and in which the housing au-
thority agrees to purchase the completed housing. HUD assures 
the availability of the purchase money upon completion of the 
project, and assures the developer that, if the housing authority 
should fail to carry out its contract obligations, HUD will assume 
the rights and obligations of the housing authority under the 
contract. The housing authority pays the developer upon comple-
tion of construction and the "turning over of the keys."4 
In the present case the Lawrence Housing Authority, under its con-
tributions contract with HUD, executed a letter of intent with the 
private developer who agreed to construct housing units on property 
owned or to be acquired by the developer and approved by the local 
housing authority and HUD. The authority agreed to purchase the 
completed project if it complied with the approved plans and specifi-
cations. 
The commissioner brought a bill in equity, seeking injunctive and 
declaratory relief against the authority and developer, to restrain them 
from making or receiving any payments for work performed in the 
construction of the contemplated housing project, and to have a 
declaration that the letter of intent and contract of sale for the project 
violated the competitive bidding laws. 
In a companion case, 18 taxpayers of the city of Lawrence brought a 
bill in equity against the same defendants as well as against the city 
and its Redevelopment Authority. The taxpayers sought to enjoin the 
turnkey process at its various junctures. Their bill prayed to restrain 
the performance of a "Cooperation Agreement" between the city and 
Housing Authority, to restrain the city from expending any funds to 
carry out the project, and to restrain the Redevelopment Authority 
from conveying certain land to the developer.5 
4 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1323, 1324-1325, 261 N.E.2d 331, 332-333. See 42 U.S.C. §1410 
(Supp. IV, 1965-1968). 
5 The Superior Court judge entered a final decree dismissing the commissioner's 
bill and, on the defendants' counterclaim for declaratory relief, declaring the turnkey 
housing process not violative of the minimum wage and competitive bidding 
provisions of Chapter 149. Similarly, on the taxpayers' bill, he sustained the 
defendants' demurrer. 
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The commissioner's most specific contentions were that the au-
thority's letter of intent and proposed contract with the developer 
amounted to a contract for construction of all buildings by a govern-
mental unit within the meaning of Section 44A, and for construction of 
public works within the meaning of Sections 26 and 27 of Chapter 149; 
and that the construction constituted the "development" of a housing 
project within the meaning of Sections 12 and 29 of Chapter 121B.u 
Under these provisions, he argued, the contract should have been 
awarded in accordance with the competitive bidding laws of Sections 
44A-44L, and the wages involved in construction should be determined 
by him under Sections 26 and 27 of Chapter 149.7 
As a matter of statutory construction, the Court held the turnkey 
procedure to be exempt from the competitive bidding and minimum 
wage requirements of Chapter 149. Viewing its decision in Commis-
~ioner of Labor &. Industries v. Boston Housing Authoritys as con-
trolling; the Court concluded that "the authorization given local hous-
ing authorities in present Chapter 121B (formerly Chapter 121) to 
cooperate with the federal government is sufficiently broad to en-
compass the use of the turnkey procedure," even though the turnkey 
procedure obviously could not have been known to the legislature 
when the antecedent Chapter 121 was enacted. 
More specifically, Section 26P of former Chapter 121 (Acts of 1946, 
c. 574, §1) authorized local housing authorities "(a) ... to receive loans, 
grants, and annual or other periodic contributions from the federal 
government," and "(b) ... to act as agent of, or to cooperate with the 
federal government in any ... housing project." (Emphasis by Court.) 
Substantially the same language is preserved in the present housing 
authority law of Chapter 121B.o 
6 These minimum wage provisions were formerly contained in G.L., c. 121, §26T. 
7 The authority countered this emphasis on the statutory term construction with 
the narrow contention that its agreement constituted a contract for acquisition by 
the authority of a completed project" rather than for its construction. Thus it 
argued that, under the present housing authority law of Chapter 121B, acquisition 
contracts are differentiated from construction contracts so that' the competitive 
bidding and minimum wage provisions of Chapter 149 do not apply to the 
turnkey transaction. 
However, tlle Court preferred not to ground its decision on a narrow characteriza-
tion of the turnkey arrangement as a contract for "construction" or for "acquisi-
tion" of a pJlblic building or public work. 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1323, 1327, 261 
N.E.2d 331, 334. 
s 345 Mass. 406, 188 N.E.2d 150 (1963). In the Boston Housing Authority case 
the Court held that, under a "contribution contract" with the Federal Public Hous-
ing Administration prohibiting operating expenditures by the local authority in 
excess of the budget approved. by the Housing Administration, the provisions of 
former Section 26 of Chapter 121, providing for wage rate determination by the 
Commissioner of Labor and Industries, did not require compliance where the de-
termined wage rates caused a budgetary excess in violation of the "contributions 
contract" and federal policy furnishing low rent· housing. 
9 See G.L., c. 121B, §§ll(a)·(b), inserted by Acts of 1969, c. 751, §I; and see G.L., 
c. I21B, §Il(k), preserving the language of former c. 121,. §26Y .. 
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For added emphasis, the Suprerne Judicial Court stressed the concept 
of the local housing authority as an agent of HUD in the performance 
of a federal function under the authorization of formt::r Chapter 121 
and present Chapter l21B. "The Commissioner, therefore, has no more 
power to require the housing authority to comply with the competitive 
bidding and minimum wage laws than he would have were HUD itself 
contracting with [the developer]."10 · 
In short, the Court gave full play to the continuing s.tate legislative 
intent to realize fully the use of federal financial assistance by local 
governments. Its statutory construction accords fully with its own 
precedent, the spirit of the legislation, and certainly the felt municipal 
needs of the time.U 
B. LEGISLATION 
§24.12. Collective bargaining. Chapter 340 of the Acts of 19701 
provides that provisions of a collective bargaining agreement conflict-
ing with any law, ordinance or by-law shall yield to the law, ordinance 
or by-law; but that the provisions "shall prevail over any regulation 
made by a chief of police pursuant to section ninety-seven A of chapter 
forty-one or by the chief or other head of a fire department under the 
provisions of chapter forty-eight." 
It is important to read this provision in light of the first sentence of 
paragraph 2 of §178I (requiring bargaining in good faith with respect 
to wages, hours and other conditions of employment) to determine in 
the first instance the proper subject matter of a collective bargaining 
agreement. In the 1970 decision of Chief of Police v. Town of Dracut,2 
the Supreme Judicial Court required that a valid collective bargaining 
provision be reasonably related to wages, hours and other conditions of 
employment, and suggested that certain terms, such as the daily assign-
ment of personnel by the police chief, were inherently outside the scope 
of negotiable wages, hours and other conditions of employment. These 
items, then, would not fall within the new provision and would not 
necessarily prevail over a conflicting regulation made by a department 
chief. 
§24.13. Consumer protection: Local consumer advisory commis-
sions. Chapter 153 of the Acts of 19701 authorizes a city by ordi-
10 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1323, 1330, 261 N.E.2d 331, 336. And see Boston Housing 
Authority case, 345 Mass. 406, 415, 188 N.E.2d 150, 157 (1963), 
11 The Court's survey of the welter of Massachusetts public housing provisions 
beginning in the late 1940s Tefiected full appreciation of the overriding "(l]egis1ative 
concern for assuring that all available Federal funds be made vse of. . . ." 1970 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 1323, 1330 n.ll, 261 N.E.2d 331, 336 n.l L 
§24.12. 1 G.L., c. 149, §1781. 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531. See §24.6 supra. 
§24.13. 1 G.L., c. 40, §SF .. 
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nance and a town by by-law to establish a consumer advisory commis-
sion (1) to conduct investigation and research into "matters of con-
sumer interest" and (2) to report the results of such investigations and 
research to "the general public" as well as "to local governmental au-
thorities and law enforcement agencies." The commission is required 
to submit an annual report to the city or town and to send a copy 
thereof to the Consumers' Council of the Commonwealth. 
§24.14. Education: Acquisition of parochial school facilities; state 
construction grants in depressed or redevelopment areas; voluntary 
school prayer. Chapter 87 of the Acts of 1970 authorizes the city of 
Gloucester to purchase, renovate and expand the facilities of the city's 
failing Catholic high school, and to appropriate a sum up to $5 million 
for this purpose. Such legislation is significant as one form of response 
by state and local government to the anticipated financial failure of the 
parochial school system in Massachusetts.! 
Chapter 793 of the Acts of 19702 increases the rate of state school 
construction grants for regional school districts in which at least 60 
percent of all the member cities and towns are in depressed or redevel-
oped areas within specified federal definitions. 
Chapter 264 of the Acts of 19703 authorizes the school committee of 
any city or town to permit any child attending its public schools to 
participate in voluntary prayer with the approval of the child's 
parents. The prayer shall take place before the commencement of the 
daily school session. No city or town permitting school prayer shall be 
denied any Commonwealth funds for school purposes. 
This statute, of course, suggests constitutional questions to be raised 
in light of the Supreme Court's 1962 decision of Engel v. Vitale. 4 The 
constitutionality of any particular school prayer program seems likely 
to turn on the actual details of its implementation. 
§24.15. Environmental law:1 Air pollution control by state and 
local governments: Regulation of refuse disposal sites. Chapter 838 
of the Acts of 19702 declares that any department, agency, commission, 
authority or political subdivision of the Commonwealth having control 
or supervision of any "structure or property" shall cooperate with the 
Department of Public Health to prevent and control air pollution re-
sulting from such "structure or property." 
The same governmental units shall be subject to rules and regula-
tions adopted by the Department of Public Health. The department 
is empowered to serve local governmental units with cease and desist 
orders for violation of the rules and regulations. An objecting unit is 
§24.14. 1 See 1969 Ann. Surv. Mass. Law §18.1. 
2 Amending Special Acts of 1948, c. 645, §9. 
SAmending-G.L., c. 71, §37B. ·· 
4 370 u.s. 421 (1962). 
§24.15. 1 See also Chapter 26 infra. 
2 G.L., c. lll, §142E. 
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entitled to a hearing before a person, designated by the commissioner, 
whose recommendations may be amended and adopted by the Depart-
ment of Public Health as a final decision under G.L., c. 30A, §14, and 
thus subject to judicial review. 
In the case of violations of departmental orders, the department may 
file a bill of complaint in the Superior Court to enjoin such violation 
(though such proceedings are strictly limited to the questions (a) 
whether the order was violated, and (b) whether the relief sought is 
appropriate). 
Chapter 839 of the Acts of 197()3 provides that the site of refuse 
facilities created by private persons or local governments must be as-
signed by the board of health for the appropriate city or town, after a 
public hearing subject to the provisions of any ordinance or by-law 
adopted under Chapter 40A or corresponding provisions of earlier 
laws, and after public notice of such assignment has been given by the 
board of health. The board of health may impose appropriate limita-
tions with the assignment, and the local board may request the advice 
of the Department of Public Health prior to the assignment. 
Persons aggrieved by the action of a board of health may include 
the selectmen of any town, or the city manager (in cities having a 
Plan D or Plan E charter), or the mayor. These, when authorized by a 
vote of the city council, may appeal to the department from the board's 
assignment of a refuse disposal site (within 60 days of the publication 
of notice of assignment). The department is given authority, after due 
notice and a public hearing, to rescind or suspend an assignment or 
impose conditions on it. 
In every case the department must approve the design and use of a 
facility. 
Every person or local government operating a refuse facility shall 
maintain it to prevent nuisance or danger to public health by various 
forms of air pollution (odors, dust, fire, smoke) and breeding of disease 
carriers (rodents, flies, vermin). In cases of violation, the local board, 
or the department, may rescind, suspend or modify an assignment after 
due notice and public hearing. 
The department is authorized to promulgate rules and regulations, 
and the commissioner to issue orders to enforce this provision. Any 
person or local government violating this section or the pursuant rules, 
regulations, or orders shall be punished by fine of from $100 to $500 
per day per violation. 
The Superior Court is given jurisdiction in equity to enforce the 
provisions of this section upon petition of the department or of any 
aggrieved person. 
§24.16. Metropolitan Area Planning Council. Chapter 849 of the 
3 Id. §l50A. 
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Acts of 19701 further defines the composition and self-governing pro-
cedures of the council, defines the Metropolitan Planning District and 
authorizes it to make contracts and expenditures. This new legislation 
also encourages a maximum exchange of useful planning informa-
tion with all other governmental units. 
§24.17. Officers, agents and employees. Chapter 295 of the Acts 
of 19701 provides that no firefighter shal1 be required to carry firearms 
in the performance of his duty. Chapter 354 of the Acts of 19702 pro-
vides that no city or town shall require a permanent member of its 
fire department to perform the duties of a police officer during his 
tour of duty. 
Chapter 628 of the Acts of 19703 provides that in any city adopting 
that section no uniformed police officer, and no other uniformed per-
son empowered to make arrests, shall be required to wear a badge, 
tag or label of any kind identifying him by name, but any such of-
ficer or other person not wearing such a badge, tag or label shall wear 
a badge, tag or label identifying him by number. 
Chapter 835 of the Acts of 19704 provides a career incentive pay pro-
gram for regular full-time officers in the city and town police depart-
ments, and in the state, capitol and metropolitan district commission 
police. Base salary increases are geared to degree and semester-hour 
progress requirements. Any city or town accepting the provisions of 
this section and providing career incentive salary increases for police 
officers shall be reimbursed by the Commonwealth for one-half the cost 
of such payments upon certification by the board of higher education. 
§24.18. Rent and eviction control. Chapter 842 of the Acts of 
19701 creates a comprehensive scheme of rent and eviction control 
adoptable by cities, and by towns with a population of 50,000 or more. 
The Act was passed in recognition of a housing emergency resulting 
in abnormally high rents, and in a substantial and increasing shortage 
of rental housing accommodations for families of low and moderate 
income. (Section 1.) 
Administrative machinery consists of a bureau of rental housing 
within the Department of Community Affairs, which will provide 
receptive municipalities with data, advice and "other assistance," in-
cluding the advice that the local execution "does not conform to the 
intent of this act." (Section 4.) 
Actual rent setting, rent adjustment, and eviction control is to be 
§24.16. 1 G.L., c. 40B, §§24-29. G.L., c. 6, §§109-114, are repealed. 
§24.17. 1 G.L., c. 48, §89. 
2 Id. §88. 
3 G.L., c. 41, §98C. 
4 Id. §108L. 
§24.18. 1 The act expires Apr. 1, 1975. 
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administered by local rent control boards or by a rent confrol adminis-
trator, determined and appointed by the mayor, city manager, or 
selectmen to serve "at the pleasure of the appointing authority." The 
board or the administrator will have investigatory and rule-making 
powers. (See Section 5.) 
Generally, the maximum rent of a controlled rental unit shall be the 
rent charged the occupant for the month six months prior to the ac-
ceptance of this act by a municipality. 
The board or the administrator shall require registration of all con-
trolled rental units on forms to be authorized and provided by the 
board or administrator. (Section 6.) 
The board or the administrator shall make such individual or gen-
eral adjustments, either upward or downward, of the maximum rent 
established by Section 6 for any controlled rental unit or any class of 
controlled rental units as may be necessary to assure that controlled 
rents yield to landlords "a fair net operating income" for those units. 
Criteria for adjustment to a fair net operating income are itemized in 
terms of deterioration or improvement. 
The board may remove maximum rental levels for any class of con-
trolled units if it determines that the shortage of such units at those 
rental levels has ceased to exist. (Section 7.) 
The board or administrator shall consider an adjustment of rent for 
an individual controlled rental unit upon receipt of a petition for 
adjustment filed by the landlord or tenant of such unit m· upon its own 
initiative. (Section 8.) 
Evictions of tenants from controlled rental units are prohibited 
except upon specific enumerated grounds including the failure to pay 
rent (Section 9(a)(l)) and "for any other just cause, provided that his 
[landlord's] purpose is not in conflict with the provisions and purposes 
of this act" (Section 9(a)(l0)). 
Judicial review of any action, regulation or order of a board or 
administrator is committed first to the appropriate local district court 
entrusted with exclusive original jurisdiction upon complaint of an 
aggrieved party. The decision of the district court may be appealed as 
if an ordinary civil action in that court. (Section 10.) 
Civil remedies against landlords demanding, accepting, receiving or 
retaining excessive rent include liquidated damages of $100, or not 
more than treble the amount of the excess, whichever is greater; as 
well as reasonable attorney's fees and costs as determined by the court. 
However, if the defendant proves that the violation was neither willful 
nor the result of failure "to take practicable precautions against the 
occurrence of the violation," the amount of the liquidated damages 
shall be the amount of the excess. 
If the aggrieved tenant fails to bring the action within 30 days of the 
violation, the board or the administrator may settle the claim or bring 
the action itself. (Section ll.) 
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Criminal penalties are to be imposed for excess rents, and for false 
testimony before the board or the administrator. Punishment shall be 
by fine of not more than $500 or by imprisonment for not more than 
90 days, or both. Second or subsequent offenses permit fines up to 
$3000 or imprisonment for not more than a year, or both. (Section 12.) 
In response to the Supreme Judicial Court's decision of Marshal 
House, Inc. v. Rent Review & Grievance Board of Brookline,2 Chapter 
843 of the Acts of 1970 provides specifically for the establishment and 
administration of rent regulation and eviction control in the town of 
Brookline. With minor variations, the act substantially parallels Chap-
ter 842. 
The declaration of public emergency includes special mention of the 
plight of the elderly on fixed incomes. (Section 1.) 
The town is authorized to regulate rents by by-law and through a 
rent board. "The rent board shall have all powers necessary or con-
venient to perform its functions" of regulating rents and evictions, 
including rule-making, information-gathering and investigative powers. 
Violations of by-laws or of orders by the board shall be punishable by 
a fine of not more than $1000 for any one offense. (Section 2.) 
The board has general and individual rent adjustment power under 
the standard of a "fair net operating income" for the landlord. (Sec-
tion 3.) 
The Administrative Procedure Act, G.L., c. 30A, is made applicable 
to the board. (Section 4.) 
The Brookline Municipal Court is given original jurisdiction, along 
with the Superior Court, of all petitions for review brought pursuant to 
G.L., c. 30A, §14. The Superior Court is given jurisdiction in equity to 
enforce the provisions of this act, and any by-laws adopted, and may 
restrain violations by injunction. (Section 5.) 
The town is empowered to regulate eviction by by-law, and the 
board may issue orders as a defense to an action of summary process 
for possession. (Section 6.) 
Chapter 8633 of the Acts of 1970 authorized the city of Boston to 
control rent by ordinance in structures of three or more dwelling units 
(exclusive of three-unit structures occupied by the owner in permanent 
residence), to establish a board to set the maximum rent (which is 
suggested to be that which was in effect on December I, 1968), and to 
make individual and general equitable adjustments in maximum rents. 
The standard for adjustments is to be "a fair net operating income for 
the landlord" with due consideration for (a) local taxes; (b) operating 
expenses; (c) major capital improvements; (d) changes in living space, 
services, furniture, furnishings, equipment; and (e) substantial deterio-
ration of the accommodations. (Section 2.) 
Evictions are limited to specific enumerated grounds including, inter 
2 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1031, 260 N.E.2d 200. See §24.8 supra. 
3 Amending Acts of 1969, c. 797. 
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alia, (1) nonpayment of rent, and (2) any just cause, provided that the 
landlord's "purpose is not in conflict with the provision of this act." A 
landlord seeking repossession must apply to the board for a certificate 
of eviction. Eviction without a certificate shall be subject to criminal 
prosecution. A decision by the board on a certificate is appealable by 
either party to the appropriate district court. (See Section 3.) . 
A landlord charging excess rent shall be liable for civil damages to 
the tenant, or to the city, for reasonable attorney's fees plus liquidated 
damages of $100, or not more than three times the amount of excess, 
whichever is greater. However, if the landlord proves the violation to 
be neither willful nor the result of his failure to take practicable pre-
cautions against the violation, the amount shall be the overcharge itself. 
If the tenant fails to prosecute a violation of the act or of any 
pursuant rule, regulation or ordinance within 30 days of its occurrence, 
the board may settle the claim or prosecute it for the same civil dam-
ages to which the tenant would be entitled. (Section 3.) 
Criminal penalties for excess rent or other violations of the act, 
including false testimony before the board, shall include a fine of not 
more than $500 or imprisonment of not more than 90 days, or both; 
for second or subsequent offenses, a fine of not more than $3000 or im-
prisonment of not more than one year, or both. 
The district court for the district of the accommodations shall have 
exclusive original jurisdiction over such actions and complaints. The 
Superior Court shall have jurisdiction in equity to restrain by injunc-
tion any violation of this act or pursuant ordinances or rules, regula-
tions and orders of the board. 
§24.19. Urban job incentive bureau. Chapter 848 of the Acts of 
19701 creates an urban job incentive bureau in the Department of 
Community Affairs. The bureau shall develop and coordinate a state-
wide manpower employment assistance and training program, with 
special attention to "urban areas containing sections of substantial 
poverty." The act defines business facilities eligible for participation 
in the manpower program and grants specified corporation excise tax 
credits to business facilities. 
C. STUDENT COMMENTS 
§.24.20. Acceptance statutes and the Home Rule Amendment: 
Chief of Police v. Town of Dracut.l The chief .of police of Dracut, 
acting in his official capacity, brought this suit in equity against the 
town, its board of selectmen, and the Dracut Police Relief Association, 
§24.19. 1 G.L., c. 23B, §§11-15; c. 63, §§38E·38F. The statutory purpose is "to 
develop manpower training and assistance programs, to neutralize urban tax 
barriers and to encourage industrial development and job potential in depressed 
areas." · 
§24.20. 1 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 258 N.E.2d 531. 
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Inc. He sought a declaratory judgment to determine the validity of a 
vote of a special town meeting of October 16, 1967, which purported 
to rescind the town's prior acceptance of G.L., c. 41, §97A, and sub-
stitute therefor Section 97 of Chapter 41; and to determine the relative 
rights of the selectmen and the chief in the governing of the town's 
police department. On March 7, 1955, the town valid!y accepted Sec-
tion 97 A, the provisions of which vest in the chief of police the exclu-
sive authority (1) "to make suitable regulations governing the police 
department and the officers thereof [subject in certain cases to the 
approval of the selectmen)"; (2) to "control ... all town property 
used by the department, and ... [its] police officers"; and (3) to "assign 
[officers] to their respective duties." This section places authority in the 
selectmen, however, to establish a police department, to appoint the 
chief of police and such officers as they deem necessary and to fix their 
compensation. Subject to civil service requirements, moreover, the 
selectmen are authorized to remove the appointed chief and officers for 
cause after a hearing.2 
It was the existence of this statutory framework which led to the con-
troversy in this case. In May, 1967, the defendant association informed 
the selectmen that it had been properly designated the "exclusive col-
lective bargaining agent" for the members of the town's police force, 
and requested recognition as such.3 Subsequently, in July, the board 
of selectmen by unanimous vote granted the requested recognition and 
designated plaintiff as their representative for negotiations with the 
association. Despite this designation, the chief informed the selectmen 
that he would not serve in such a capacity, and on August 31, 1967, 
the selectmen informed the association that they would represent them-
selves in such negotiations.4 Thereafter, negotiations were undertaken 
2 G.L., c. 41, §97A provides: "In any town which accepts this section there shall 
be a police department established by the selectmen, and such department shall 
be under the supervision of an officer to be known as the chief of police. The 
selectmen of any such town shall appoint a chief of police and such other officers 
as they deem necessary, and fix their compensation, not exceeding, in the a~gre~ate, 
the annual appropriation therefor. In any such town in which such appointments 
are not subject to chapter thirty-one, they shall be made annually and the select-
men may remove such chief or other officers for cause at any time after a hearing. 
The chief of police in any such town shall from time to time make suitable reg-
ulations governing the police department, and the officers thereof, subject to the 
approval of the selectmen; provided, that such regulations shall become effective 
without such approval upon the failure of the selectmen to take action thereon 
within thirty days after they have been submitted to them by the chief of police. 
The chief of police in any such town shall be in immediate control of all town prop-
erty used by the department, and of the police officers, whom he shall assign to 
their respective duties and who shall obey his orders. Section ninety-seven shall 
not apply in any town which accepts the provisions of Jhis section. Acceptance of 
the provisions of this section shall be by a vote at an annual town meeting." 
3 Paquette v. Inhabitants of Dracut, Eq. No. 28519 (Super. Ct., Middlesex Co., 
Aug. 2, 1968) [hereinafter cited as Superior Ct. Opinion]. 
:4.1bid. 
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and completed prior to the special town. meeting at which the vote 
attempting to rescind Section 97A was taken. On OctobE!r 26, 1967, a 
collective bargaining agreement, incorporating the substance of those 
negotiations, was signed by the town, acting through its selectmen and 
the association.5 
.Under the terms of the agreement, the assignment of officers and the 
granting of leaves of absence and vacations were to be made in ac-
cordance with rank, seniority, and personal preference, without the 
approval of the chief. In addition, the agreement required that all 
rules and regulations of the police department be subject to the ap-
proval of the selectmen, and that a proper uniform requirement, to 
include weapons, be established.6 
5 Ibid. The collective bargaining process is governed by G.L., c. 149, §§I78G• 
178N. It appears that even before they entered into that collec:tive bargaining 
agreement, the selectmen and the association were doubtful of its validity in view 
of the operation of Section 97 A vesting exclusive authority in the chief of police 
to make regulation governing the police department. Subsequently, the attempt 
was made to rescind that statute and to substitute in its place Section 97, which 
empowers the selectmen, and not the chief, to "make suitable regulations govern· 
ing the police department and the officers thereof." G.L., c. 41, §97. 
6 The language of these disputed articles, or parts thereof, follows: "Art. 4. 
Each employee shall be granted special leave with pay for a day on which he is 
able to secure another employee to work in his place provided: (A) Such substitu· 
tion does not impose any additional cost on the town. (B) The Chief of Police 
or his representative shall be notified on an appropriate form not less than one 
day prior to its becoming effective, except in the case of emergency, notification 
may be made by telephone. (C) Neither the Department rior the Town is held 
responsible for enforcing any agreements made between employees. (D) Officer 
in Charge of shifts approves the change. 
"Art. 7. Leave of Absence Without Pay: One leave of absence for limited period 
not to exceed one (1) month shall be granted for any reasonable purposes, and 
such leaves shall be .extended or. renewed up to 90 days; the total to include first 
month. Only one leave every five (5) yearsexcept at discretion of employer. Number 
of men on leave at one time is to be at discretion of employer. _Reasonable purpose 
in each case shall be agreed upon by the Association and the Employer. 
"Art. 11. Seniority: ... (2) Part Time Employees a. MUst be worked according 
to seniority on rotating .basis from top to bottom of list; on refusal by any member 
he shall return to the bottom of list. (3) Outside Details (Except Clubs and 
Organizations) a. To start by rank and seniority with the Captain through the 
Lieutenant, and the Sergeants to the Patrolmen through the intermittent list to 
the bottom and start all over again at the top; except. on special request by Select· 
men. b. If an employee wishes to waive his rights to details, he must sign a waiver to 
that effect and will not be asked until.he wishes his name to be put back on the list, 
and he will not be called until they start at the top again. Other Provisions: (1) 
All shift assignments of regular employees shall be made in accordance with 
preference expressed in writing with respect to rank and seniority. (2) No employee 
shall be assigned to more than one shift, and employees shall not be required to 
work a shift other than the one which they are assigned, except in an emergency 
or as an overtime assignment. (3) All assignments tq shifts shall be posted in the 
Police Station. 
"Art. 12. Vacations: ... Vacation shall be granted in accordance with the 
seniority provisions of this agreement. Each employee shall be permitted vacation 
leave at such times during the vacation year he may request. In instances- where 
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The case was tried in the Superior Court of Middlesex County as a 
case stated.7 Therein the plaintiff contended that the vote of the special 
town meeting purporting to rescind Section 97 A was invalid and void, 
and that consequently the provisions of that statute had continued to 
remain in effect. He further contended that certain key articles of the 
collective bargaining agreement of October 26, 1967, were likewise null 
and void in that they conflicted with his exclusive authority under 
Section 97A, ot in that they went beyond the scope of the selectmen's 
authority, which is limited to negotiating "with respect to wages, hours 
and other conditions of employment."S The defendants generally de-
nied these contentions.9 The trial judge, relying on the rule enun-
ciated in Brucato v. City of Lawrence1o relating to statutes such 
as Section 97A that are enacted subject to local acceptance, held 
that the attempted rescission of Section 97 A was null and void, and 
that the provisions of that section were in effect in Dracut. In its deter· 
ruination, the court relied upon G.L., c. 149, §178H, which provides 
inter alia that where a collective bargaining agreement conflicts with 
any law, ordinance, or by-law, the law, ordinance, or by-law shall pre· 
vail. The court further held that the selectmen had no authority to 
an employee can not be granted vacation at the time he requests, he shall be 
given the reason(s) for denial in writing and shall have the right to use the griev-
ance procedure if he is aggrieved. Vacations shall be picked by April 1st. 
"Art. 17. Personnel and Training: I. Establishment of the position of Per-
sonnel and Training Officer to be appointed by the Board of Selectmen and to be 
responsible for personnel files and a training program for all officers. This is in 
addition to regular duties. 2. The establishment of rules and regulations for all 
police officers of the Dracut Police Department, set up by the Chief and approved 
by the Board of Selectmen. 3. A program to be set up under the direction of 
the Personnel and Training Officer to send at least one officer per year to special-
ized school other than that which is required by statute. 4. Establishment of a 
proper uniform requirement which is to include weapons. 
"Art. 18. Extra Paid Details: I. Such assignments shall be made by the Chief 
or his representative by seniority as provided in the Seniority Section of this Con-
tract. The Chief shall maintain a record of all such assignments, which may be 
examined at any time by a representative of the Association. No officer or other 
person shall accept any such assignment unless the same is made by the Chief or 
his representative. 2. No such assignment shall be made until the person or 
organization requesting services has agreed to pay a minimum of three (3) hours 
reporting time and at all times paying no less than $3.00 per hour. 
"Art. 19. Responsibility and Morale: I. That the keys to the files in the Police 
Department be held by the officer in charge of each shift and those keys to be 
given in hand to the relieving officer in charge of the next shift. 2. The estab-
lishment of an officer under the direction of the Chief in charge of property to 
be tailed the Personnel Officer. flig responsibilities are as follows: a. Property 
found, recovered, stolen, lost or confiscated, etc. b. Keep the keys to the room 
set aside for same. c. Keep a log separate on same. d. Supervise the yearly auc-
tion, as required by statute. e. In charge of all outside work details. f. Respon-
sible for the proper maintenance of vehicles and equipment." 
7 Superior Ct. Opinion. 
8 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 771, 775, 258 N.E.2d 5!11, 533, 536 .. 
9 Superior Ct. Opinion. 
10 338 Mass. 612, lM N,Ji:,2d 676 (1959). 
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bargain collectively on matters dealing with the making of regulations 
for the governing of the police department, or with the assignment of 
police officers, the authority for both of which is placed by Section 97 A 
exclusively in the chief of police. The court ruled in favor of the 
plaintiff as to all of the disputed articles of the agreement, all of which 
were held to be in conflict with the chief's authority.11 
The Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the holding of the trial court 
relative to the attempted rescission of Section 97 A, and in so doing 
addressed itself to the question of whether the rule of Brucato was 
still operative in view of the Home Rule Amendment of 1966.12 The 
Court did, however, specifically find that certain provisions of the col-
lective bargaining agreement were in conflict with no "law, ordinance 
or by-law,"13 and as such were enforceable by the defendants.14 The 
Court, therefore, affirmed with appropriate modifications the decree 
of the Superior Court.15 
It is interesting to note that in the trial court the defendants made 
no attempt to overcome the rule laid down in Brucato, even though 
that rule, if still valid in Massachusetts, would have served to invali-
date the attempted rescission of Section 97A which was so essential to 
their defense. Rather, they simply entered a denial that the attempted 
rescission was void.l6 Having suffered an adverse judgment, however, 
the defendants on appeal entered a further contention that the rule 
of Brucato was rendered void and obsolete by virtue of the Home 
Rule Amendment. Although there was no indication either in the 
pleadings or in the trial judge's opinion that the issue was open on the 
record, the Supreme Judicial Co'urt nevertheless undertook its resolu-
tion.17 
In Brucato the Court had recognized as a right the legislative prac-
tice of enacting statutes whose operation is made subject to the oc-
currence of some specified event or condition of action. In so doing, 
the Court made reference to statutes Which become operative only 
upon acceptance by the municipalities for which they are enacted: 
It is not unusual for the Legis~ature to provide that a statute 
expressed in terms of general application shall take effect in each 
city and town only upon its acceptance by such city and town .... 
11 Superior Ct. Opinion. 
12 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89. 
13 G.L., c. 149, §1781. 
14 For example, the Court ruled that Article 5 of the agreement, which required 
the chief to "Maintain a complete record of all overtime ~nd sick leave accnmula-
tion" and to make these records available to the association, was within the power 
of the selectmen to agree to and did not, as was held bY the Superior_ Court, con-
stitute an exercise of rule-making authority. 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 779, 258 
N.E.2d 531, 538. 
15 Id. at 780, 258 N.E.2d at 5!19. 
16 Superior Ct. Opinion. 
17 1970 Mass. Adv, Sh, 7691 772.-774, 258 _ N,E.2_d 5!1h 534-535_, 
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The Legislature may provide that a city or town, which once 
accepts a statute ... shall have the power to revoke its accep-
tance .... In the absence, however, of some indication in the lan-
guage, the form, or the subject matter of a particular statute 
enacted subject to local acceptance, that an acceptance once given 
may be revoked, the effect of a valid acceptance by a city or town 
is to make the statute operative in that community until the stat-
ute is repealed or amended [by the Legislature ps [Emphasis 
added.] 
The Court added that once the condition precedent stipulated by the 
legislature as necessary for the taking effect of the statute (in this case 
acceptance by the town) is satisfied, "it becomes applicable statute 
law, subject to change ... only by subsequent action of the Legisla-
ture."19 
This, then, constitutes the rule of Brucato, which both the Superior 
Court and the Supreme Judicial Court utilized in holding invalid the 
town of Dracut's attempt to rescind Section 97A, and which had been 
upheld in a number of subsequent decisions.2° Clearly, if this rule had 
been valid when the vote of the special town meeting was taken, the 
defendant town had acted without authority. This fact, moreover, 
was conceded by the Dracut defendants.21 Section 97A is without ques-
tion the type of statute to which the rule applies. The statute can be-
come operative only in a town which accepts its provisions "by a vote 
at an annual town meeting."22 This was done in Dracut, and since the 
statute contains no indication in its language, form, or subject matter 
that, once accepted, it can be unilaterally revoked by the accepting 
municipality, it is clear that, in accordance with the rule of Brucato, 
it could be revoked only by the legislature. This Dracut failed to se-
cure.23 
The correctness.of the decision in Dracut is, therefore, solely depen-
dent upon two factors: (I) whether the premise, basic to the Court's 
rationale, that the town was without authority to rescind Section 97 A, 
is an accurate statement of the law in the Commonwealth; and (2) 
18 338 Mass. 612, 615-616, 156 N.E.2d 676, 678-679 (1959). 
19 Ibid. 
20 See, e.g., Donnelly v. Dover-Sherborn Regional School Dist., 341 Mass. 497, 
500 n.l, 170 N.E.2d 694, 696 n.l (1960); Oleksak v. City of Westfield, 342 Mass. 50, 
52-53, 172 N.E.2d 85, 87 (1961); McDonough v. City of Lowell, 350 Mass. 214, 216, 
214 N.E.2d 50, 51 (1966). 
21 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 772, 258 N.E.2d 531, 534. 
22 G.L., c. 41, §97A. 
23 After the trial of the case, an attempt was made to overcome the exclusive 
power of a chief of police to make regulations under Section 97A. G.L., c. 149, 
§1781 was subsequently amended so that the provisions of a collective bargaining 
agreement would prevail over any regulation made by a chief of police pursuant 
to Section 97A. (Acts of 1969, c. 341.) This amendment, however, does not alter 
the exclusive authority of the chief to make suitable regulations, and subsequently 
did nothing to assist the defendants. 
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whether the Court's analysis of the disputed articles of the collective 
bargaining agreement, regarding their conflict with any law, ordi-
nance, or by-law, is reasonable. With regard to the second factor, it 
need only be noted that in each case where the Court found the agree-
ment to be invalid, there was sufficient basis for the conclusion reached, 
and dear statutory language in conflict with the provision of the agree-
ment under discussion.24 
It is the first of the above factors, however, which causes this case 
to be of interest, because it appears that the Court misapplied both 
the Home Rule Amendment and the Home Rule Procedures Act25 
in its zeal to ensure the continued vitality of the rule of Brucato.26 
After setting forth the latter principle, the Court referred to two sec-
tions of the Home Rule Amendment: (l) Section 8, which provides 
that "the general court shall have the power to act in relation to cities 
and towns but only by general laws which apply alike to all cities, or 
to all towns, or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than 
two ... "; and (2) Section 6, which provides that "[a]ny city or town 
may, by the adoption, amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or 
by-laws, exercise any power or function which the gem:ral court has 
power to confer upon it, which is not inconsistent with the constitu-
tion or laws enacted by the general court in conformity with powers 
reserved to the general court by section eight .... " The Court addi-
tionally referred to Section 13 of the Home Rule Procedures Act: 
... Section 13 of this act repeats substantially all the language 
of §6 of the Home Rule Amendment, and in addition thereto it 
provides in part that "[n]othing in this section shall be construed 
to permit any city or town, by ordinance or by-law, to exercise any 
power or function which is inconsistent with any general law en-
acted by the general court before November eighth, nineteen hun-
dred and sixty-six which applies alike to all cities, or to all towns, 
or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two."27 
The Court then reasoned that Section 97A is such a general law, and 
"the fact that a town has an option whether or not to adopt it does 
not change its character."28 As such, the Court concluded that the 
Home Rule Amendment did nothing to render inoperative the rule 
laid down in Brucato, and it reaffirmed its position that, absent some 
24 See, e.g., Article 4 of the agreement, note 6 supra, which clearly conflicts with 
the authority of the chief to' assign ·officers to their respective dutit!s. 
25 G.L., c. 43B, passed by the General Court in the extra session of 1966 "to 
facilitate the orderly implementation of [the Home Rule Amendment]." 
26 The untimely intrqduction of the home rule issue into the case, together with 
its undetailed discussion . by the Court, could be indicative oj' an inadequate 
preparation and argument on t.he part of counsel. 
27 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 7691 773, 258 N.E.2d ~31, 534. 
28 Ibid. 
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grant by the legislature, a municipality has no authority to rescind, 
by unilateral action, its prior acceptance of a state statute. 
Although the Court has on numerous occasions adhered to the 
principle of construction that any new enactment must be interpreted 
with a view towards its purpose, and only after an investigation of the 
"reason ... leading to the legislation, . . . the supposed evil to be 
corrected, ... [and] the objective sought to be attained,"29 the Court 
in Dracut curiously neglected to utilize this technique. Although the 
Court was faced with an issue of first impression, the ramifications of 
which would be of substantial import to the future of home rule in 
the Commonwealth, it bypassed any discussion of the purpose and 
scope of the Home Rule Amendment in favor of a rather cursory ap-
plication of two isolated provisions of that amendment and one pro-
vision of the subsequently enacted Home Rule Procedures Act. The 
Court, in fact, evidenced its satisfaction with its one-sentence analysis 
of the need to continue the prohibition of such unilateral activity on 
the part of cities and towns by its statement that the legislature may 
be concerned 
... that if municipalities had unbridled authority to rescind 
prior acceptance of basic provisions of the General Laws by uni-
lateral action, there might result frequent and precipitous changes 
in the administration of municipal affairs which might produce 
chaos, all contrary to the public interest.30 
The Court's reliance on this hypothesis appears to have been necessi-
tated by its failure to adequately investigate the rationale underlying 
the constitutional grant of home rule; at the same time, this hypothe-
sis forms the basic policy consideration for the Court's decision. A 
brief examination of the Home Rule Amendment and its application 
to a statute such as Section 97A will demonstrate that there is no such 
concern on the part of the legislature. 
Prior to 1966, the power of the legislature to establish and regulate 
municipalities was governed by a state constitutional amendment 
adopted in 1821 (the predecessor to the Home Rule Amendment). It 
provided: 
The General Court ~ .. [has] full power and authority to erect 
and constitute municipal or city governments, ... to grant to the 
inhabitants thereof such powers, privileges, and immunities ... 
as the General Court ... [deems] necessary or expedient for the 
regulation and government thereof and to prescribe the manner 
of calling and holding public meetings of the inhabitants ... for 
the election of officers .... [In addition,] all bylaws made by such 
29 Mathewson v. Contributory Retirement Appeal Bd., 335 Mass. 610, 614-615, 
141 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1957). 
30 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 773, 258 N.E.2d 531, 53-4. 
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municipal or city government ... [are] subject, at all times, to be 
annulled by the General Court.a1 
As early as 1861, the Supreme Judicial Court had interpreted this con-
stitutional enactment as establishing the theory of state supremacy 
over municipal governments. In Hood v. Lynn32 the Court stated: 
The general principle is well settled that municipal corpora-
tions like other corporations aggregate, can exercise no powers 
other than those which are conferred upon them by the act by 
which they are created, or such as are necessarily incident to the 
exercise of their corporate rights, the perfection of their corpo-
rate duties, and accomplishment of the purposes for which they 
were constituted.33 
This view of the state-municipal relationship, moreover, still had 
vitality as recently as 1964, when the Court ruled that "the towns of 
the Commonwealth possess no inherent right to sel£-government_"34 
These and similar decisions by the Court, spanning well over a cen-
tury, clearly established in Massachusetts the so-called Dillon's Rule, 
which, in capsule form, states: 
... [A] municipal corporation possesses and can exercise the 
following powers, and no others: First, those granted in express 
words; second, those necessarily or fairly implied in or incident 
to the powers expressly granted; third, those essential to the ac-
complishment of the declared objects and purposes of the corpo-
ration .... Any fair, reasonable, substantial doubt concerning the 
existence of a power is resolved by the courts against the corporac 
tion, and the power is denied.35 
Being restricted in this manner, municipalities were forced to rely 
upon state statutes for authority to undertake local municipal activi-
ties. As such, the legislature was called upon to enact enabling statutes, 
special acts, and optional plans of government and administration for 
the cities and towns of the Commonwealth. As was noted by the Court 
in Dracut, these laws could only be altered, repealed, or amended by 
a subsequent act of the legislature. 
With the advent of the Home Rule Amendment, however, cities and 
towns were granted the right, previously denied, to self-government in 
local matters.36 Section 2 of the amendment provides that "[a]ny city 
or town shall have the power to adopt or revise a charter or to amend 
its existing charter," provided that "any adopted charter or revised 
31 Mass. Const. amend. art. 2. 
32 83 Mass. I (I Allen) 103 (1861). 
33 I d. at I 04. 
34 Paddock "· Town of Brookline, 347. Mass. 230, 238, 197 N.E.2d 321,. 326 (1964). 
35 I Dillon, Municipal Corporations §237 (5th ed. 1911). 
36 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89, §I. 
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charter or any charter amendment shall not be inconsistent with the 
constitution or any laws enacted by the general court in conformity 
with the power reserved to the general court by section eight."37 Un-
der this section, then, municipalities which wish to change or modify 
their existing governmental structures can do so without either peti-
tioning the legislature or applying some pre-existing authorizing stat-
ute. 
Section 6, moreover, authorizes any city or town, by the adoption, 
amendment, or repeal of local ordinances or by-laws, to "exercise any 
power or function which the general court has power to confer upon 
it, which is [likewise] not inconsistent with the constitution and laws 
enacted by the general court in conformity with ... section eight, and 
which is not denied ... to the city or town by its charter."3S This 
provision contains the basic grant of the Home Rule Amendment, 
the devolution of powers upon municipalities. Because of this grant, 
"local governments are free to engage in any activity that is not re-
served to the state by the Constitution or pre-empted by state legisla-
tion."39 As such, cities and towns, instead of searching for statutes 
authorizing municipal action, "need only be concerned about consti-
tutional or statutory provisions forbidding local action or establishing 
standards for particular actions."40 The rule enunciated by Judge 
Dillon, therefore, is effectively reversed.41 
Section 8 of the amendment serves to preserve to some degree the 
legislature's control over local municipal activity while ensuring that 
the spirit and intent of independent self-government is carried out. 
Under this section, although the General Court retains the power to 
act in relation to cities and towns, this power is clearly limited to the 
enactment of 
... general laws which apply alike to all cities, or to all towns, 
or to all cities and towns, or to a class of not fewer than two, and 
... special laws [in certain well-defined situations] .... 42 
The legislature is additionally empowered to "provide optional plans 
of city or town organization and government under which an optional 
plan may be adopted or abandoned by majority vote of the voters of 
the city or town voting thereon at a city or town election."43 The leg~ 
islature, then, although it retains its authority to pre-empt by general 
37 ld. §2. 
38 Id. §8. 
39 Gere and Curran, Home Rule pt. II, c. IV, The Constitutional Grant of Home 
Rule 33 (1969). 
40 Mass. Legislative Research Council, Report Relative to Municipal Home Rule, 
Senate No. 950, at 123 (1965). 
41 Mariner, This Is Your Massachusetts Government 39 (6th ed. 1970): "No 
more complete and far reaching, no more absolute reversal of the direction of 
governmental authority has ever occurred in an American state." 
42 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89, §8. · 
43 Ibid. 
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law any municipal power or function, no longer is able to act with 
the unbridled freedom it enjoyed prior to the amendment:.44 
Under the Home Rule Amendment, it is clear that the respective 
roles of municipal governments and the General Court have been 
substantially· altered since Brucato. An examination of these roles as 
they now exist, and their application to the force and efl'ect of accep-
tance statutes, such as Section 97 A, will reveal the error of the Court 
in Dracut. 
Section 2 of the amendment establishes the right of a town to adopt 
a charter, provided that its provisions _are not inconsistent with the 
Constitution and laws enacted by the General Court. The establish-
ment of a police department, however, is basic to the structure and or-
ganization of local governments, and as such must be considered a 
proper item for inclusion in a charter. This fact has on numerous oc· 
casions been recognized by the legislature, which in enacting special 
acts providing for the appointment of a town manager has placed the 
operation of the police department under his supervision and direc-
tion.411 It cannot be doubted, then, that should a town which has val-
idly accepted G.L., c. 41, §97A vote to adopt a charter, it should be 
allowed to include therein a provision which would bting about a 
revision or modification of the· workings of Section 97A absent, of 
course, any inconsistency with the laws enacted by the General Court. 
Would there be any "inconsistency," however, if the town adopted 
such a revision or modification? In 1968, the then Attorney General 
Richardson set forth the position of his office on questions of "incon-
sistency": 
I approach these questions of possible conflict with a view to-
wards promoting the basic purposes of the [Home Rule Amend-
ment] to foster responsible, independent local government, but 
also to respect the [amendment's] limitations on these pur-
poses ...• 46 
Since that time the Office of the Attorney General, in reviewing the 
preliminary reports of charter commissions,47 has upheld as consistent 
with state laws the provisions of a ·proposed charter which, although 
in conflict with a previously accepted section of the General Laws, 
corresponded to provisions which the legislature by either special act 
or acceptance statute had specifically allowed in other cities or towns:4s 
44 These restrictions on the powe~; of the General Court "apply to every city or 
town whether or not it has adopted a charter . . . ." Ibid. 
411 See, e.g., Acts of 1949, c. Ill, §Ill, a special att establishing a town manager 
form of government for the town of Danvers. 
'46 Letter from Eliot L. Richardson to Raymond McLarin, Chairman, Burlington 
Charter Commission, Dec. 27, 1968. 
47 Required by G.L., c. 4!1B, §9. 
48 See, e.g., Final Report of the Milford Charter Commission (Jan. 2, 1971), 
which placed the appointment of a chief of police, and the sup•~rvision._ of . the 
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In such cases, where there is no contrary overriding policy of the leg-
islature, and where there are alternative provisions contained in the 
overall body of laws enacted by the General Court, it is reasonable, 
especially in view of the scope of the Home Rule Amendment, to con-
clude that any one of these provisions might be included in a munici-
pal charter without running afoul of the amendment's Section 2 
restriction relative to "inconsistency." 
General Laws, c. 41, §97A, deals with the establishment and opera-
tion of police departments, as do Sections 96 and 97. Moreover, in 
communities which operate under special acts providing for a pro-
fessional town administrator, alternative modes of police department 
organization and supervision are authorized.49 Their existence as pro-
visions of laws enacted by the General Court must be viewed as elim-
inating any possible inconsistency between them and those laws of 
which they are a part. As such, the dictum in Dracut indicating that 
a town, once having accepted Section 97 A, cannot by unilateral action 
amend, alter, or rescind it clearly conflicts with the Home Rule 
Amendment, and therefore constitutes an inaccurate statement of the 
law. 
Apart from these considerations, however, it appears that Section 
97A is not a General Law within the meaning of Section 8 of the 
amendment, and as such does not come within the restrictions of either 
Section 2 or Section 6. As has been stated, the legislature now has the 
power to act in relation to cities and towns only by General Laws 
which "apply alike ... to all towns ... or to a class of not fewer than 
two."50 It is apparent that statutes such as Section 97A, the operation 
of which is subject to local acceptance, and which constitute one of 
several alternate schemes, cannot be said to "apply alike . . . to all 
towns." To conclude otherwise would amount to a denial of the ex-
istence of Sections 96 and 97 and the provisions of the special acts 
mentioned above. Nor can it be accurately stated that Section 97A is 
a General Law which applies alike to a class of towns no fewer than 
two. Although the amendment does not define the meaning which 
shall be given to the term class, it is obvious that Section 97A contains 
nothing in its language or form which would indicate that it should 
be applied only to towns with certain common characteristics. In 
other states, where home rule has had a longer existence, classification 
has been predicated on such bases as population, geography, types of 
government, assessed valuation, and so on.51 No such basis is pro-
day-to-day administration of the town (including the police department), within 
the authority of the town administrator. Nevertheless, Atty. Gen. Robert Quinn, 
in a letter to Milford Charter Commission Chairman David Hayes, noted no incon-
sistency between this provision and the fact that Milford had previously accepted 
Section 97 A. 
49 See note 5 supra. 
50 Mass. Const. amend. art. 89, §8. 
51 Michelman and Sandalow, Government in Ur~n Areas 346 (1970). 
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vided for in Section 97 A. In addition, since the statute is subject to 
local acceptance, there must have been a time when it app1ied only 
to one community, that is, the first town which accepted it, and there-
fore it could not have applied alike to a class of not fewer than two. 
Section 97 A, then, is not a General Law either within the meaning 
of the Home Rule Amendment or Section 13 of the Home Rule Pro-
cedures Act. By holding that it is, the Court in Dracut must have con-
cluded that a class, as used in the amendment, could be construed to 
inci.ude such dissimilar communities as the town of Brookline, with 
nearly 60,000 inhabitants, and the town of Brookfield, with just over 
2000 inhabitants. Not only does such reasoning conflict with the ordi-
nary meaning of the word, it also tends to ignore the intent of the 
amendment to promote independent local self-government. 
In its discussion of Section 97 A, the Court in Dracut noted that "a 
town has the option whether or not to adopt it."52 This admission by 
the Court, when coupled with the fact that other optional plans for 
the organization of a police depar~ment are contained in Chapter 41 
of the General Laws, 53 should have led the Court to categorize Section 
97 A as an optional plan of government for towns rather than as a 
General Law. By so doing, the Court would have been able to utilize 
the provision in the second paragraph of Section 8 of the amendment, 
which specifically empowers the legislature to provide optional plans 
of town organization and government "which may be adopted or 
abandoned by a majority vote of the voters of the ... town voting 
thereon at ... town election."M Section 97 A is such a plan. As was 
noted above, the organization of a police department is basic to the 
government of any community. Therefore, such a statute may be con-
sidered an optional plan of city or town government that is within 
the authority of the legislature to enact. Such a plan, however, must 
be such as can be adopted or abandoned by a referendum procedure. 
Moreover, it is clear from the Home Rule Amendment that any op-
tional plan is to be established as a two-way street, that is, capable of 
abandonment by the city or town aswell as acceptance by a majority 
vote at a municipal election. Section 97 A, therefore, once determined 
to fall within this provision of Section 8, must be viewed as being 
capable of rescission by any town which had previously accepted it. 
In Dracut, the Court undoubtedly was correct in holding that the 
attempted rescission of Section 97 A by the vote of the special town 
meeting was invalid and void. That statute had been validly adopted 
by the town,· and under the terms of the Home Rule Amendment, it 
could be rescinded only by a referendum procedure or a charter adop-
tion procedure, both of which are provided for in the amendment. 
This, of course, the town failed to do. To say, however, that the town 
52 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 769, 773, 258 N.E.2d 531, 534. 
53 G.L., c. 41, §§96, 97. 
54 Mass. Const. ainerid.- art. 89, §8. 
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has no authority to unilaterally rescind its prior acceptance under 
any conditions (the rule of Brucato) is demonstrably erroneous. 
The Home Rule Amendment has offered the cities and towns of 
Massachusetts a degree . of freedom never before available to them. 
The ramifications of this freedom have yet to be fully litigated in the 
courts of the Commonwealth. For these reasons, absent some clear in-
dication from the legislature that it acted so as to pre-empt municipal 
initiative and thereby deny cities and towns all authority to resolve 
their problems at the local level, courts must construe local legislative 
enactments as valid. If this is not done, the difficulties encou.ntered in 
Dracut may well be repeated and the future of home rule in Massachu". 
setts will unquestionably suffer. 
_p. EDWARD DOHERTY* 
§24.21. Municipal corporations: Inadequate supply of water to 
extinguish fire: Reynolds Boat Co. v. City of Haverhill.1 Petitioners' 
real and personal property was destroyed. in a fire on its premises in 
the city of Haverhill. This loss resulted from an inadequacy in the 
waterworks system that supplied water. to the city's fire hydrants. It 
was this inadequacy which prevented :the fire department from ex-
tinguishing the fire. The petitioners brought an action in tort alleging 
negligence on the part of the city by reason of the following: that the 
city had promised and undertaken to provide water for the petition-
er's use, and an adequate supply thereof to service hydrants in the 
area for whatever use they should be put; that the city knew that the 
water service was in some way inadequate to provide the petitionerS 
with fire protection; and that the city failed to properly maintain the 
system or to correct the defects in the water pressure or in the system 
running to the hydrant nearest the plaintiffs' property. The defen-
dant's demurrer to the petitioners' declaration stated that the allega~ 
tions set forth no action upon which relief could be granted; that a: 
municipal corporation cannot be sued in tort for the acts of its em· 
ployees; and that a municipal corporation cannot be held liable for 
damage by a fire (which it did not set) to property within its limits 
because of the failure of the municipality to provide or maintain an 
adequate supply of water or of water pressure to extinguish the fire. 
The demurrer was sustained by the Superior Court, and the petitioners 
appealed. 
In affirming the order sustaining defendant's demurrer, the Supreme 
Judicial Court HELD: In the absence of a specific contract with 
owners of property, a municipality is not liable 'for dam,age ,by fire 
resulting from the city's negligent maintenance .. of its water supply 
• P. EDWARD DoHERTY is a student· at Bosron College Law School and a former 
member of the Milford Charter Commission. 
§24.21. 11970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 26o N.E.2d l76. 
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system.2 The Court reasoned that the city makes no promise or con-
tract with property owners to furnish water for the extinguishment of 
fires, and that a waterworks system, when used to protect against fires, 
operates for the public benefit without profit. Since fire protection is 
a governmental rather than a proprietary or commercial duty, the 
city may invoke the doctrine of municipal tort immunity as a defense 
to such an action. Finally, the Court indicated that it is the duty of the 
legislature, not the judiciary, to change the existing law. 
There is some authority in Massachusetts for the application of the 
doctrine of municipal tort immunity in cases concerning the city's 
failure to supply an adequate amount of water to extinguish fires. In 
Tainter v. City of Worcester,s relied upon by the Court in Reynolds, 
the plaintiff's mill was destroyed by fire because the hydrant nearest 
his property had been shut off by the city due to plaintiff's failure to 
pay his water bills. However, the plaintiff in Tainter contended that 
to prevent water from flowing to his mill it was not necessary for the 
city to close the hydrant also, thereby endangering other surrounding 
property. The Court found that even when a municipality was negli· 
gent in shutting off a hydrant, where the waterworks system was used 
for the purpose of fire protection for public benefit and no pecuniary 
compensation was received, the city was immune from tort liability. 
Other Massachusetts decisions relied upon by the Court in Reynolds 
related to the liability of a municipal corporation while performing in 
its commercial capacity for profit. These cases involved water damage 
through the city's waterworks system,4 damage or personal injuries 
from the negligent repair of a municipal waterworks or sewer system,ll 
and injuries caused by the negligent operation of a sanitation truck.a 
No liability was found for the tortious acts of a transit department 
employee in deceiving a private construction company.7 In addition to 
Tainter, only Boston Safe-Deposit & Trust Co. v. Salem. Water Co.s 
involved damage by fire because of an inadequate supply of water. 
However, there the action by the plaintiff was against a private water 
company which had contracted with the municipality to supply water 
for domestic purposes and the extinguishment of fires, the payment for 
which would be made through taxes levied on the citizens of the city. 
The court found the defendant water company not liable for the 
reason that no privity of contract existed between the company and 
2 Id. at 986, 260 N.E.2d at 177. 
s 123 Mass. 311, 24 Am. R. 90 (1877). 
4 Gordon v. City of Medford, 331 Mass. 119, 117 N.E.2d 284 (1954); Cole Drug 
Co. v. City of Boston, 326 Mass. 199, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950). 
II Harvard Furniture Co. v. City of Cambridge, 320 Mass. 227, 68 N.E.2d 684 
(1946); Galluzzi v. City of Beverly, 309 Mass. 135, 34 N.E.2d 492 (1941); Sloper v. 
City of Quincy, 301 Mass. 20, 16 N.E.2d 14 (1938). 
6 Baumgardner v. City of Boston, 304 Mass. 100, 23 N.E.2d 121 (1939). 
7 Galassi Mosaic Be Tile Co. v. City of Boston, 295 Mass. 544, 4 N.K2d 291 (1936). 
8 94 F. 238 (C.C.N.D. Ohio 1899). 
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the plaintiff. The decision in Boston Safe-Deposit was based upon a 
contractual relationship existing between the city and a private water 
company, where no duty was owed to an individual citizen, and not 
on the city's tort immunity from negligent acts committed during the 
performance of a governmental function. Consequently, the Supreme 
Judicial Court, in deciding Reynolds, appears to have relied substan-
tially upon Tainter as Massachusetts precedent involving a similar 
factual situation, apparently ignoring the economic and social changes 
of nearly a century that separated the two cases. However, decisions in 
other jurisdictions support Reynolds as a majority approach.9 Only a 
handful of cases have denied municipal tort immunity to a city where 
negligence in the maintenance of its waterworks system, that is, an 
inadequate supply of water, was the proximate cause of loss by fire.10 
Confronted with arguments that the passage of time had undermined 
the rationale of the Tainter ruling, the Reynolds Court was content 
with a restatement of that ruling and an acknowledgment that "[t]he 
same general principle continues to be observed elsewhere."11 
Before examining the application of municipal tort immunity in 
Reynolds, a preliminary inquiry into the underlying theories and 
evolution of the doctrine of municipal tort immunity is warranted. 
The municipal corporation is an artificial creation of the sovereign. 
It is subordinate to the state and derives from it the authority to act 
for the public benefit.12 Prior to the sixteenth century, sovereign im-
munity was considered a personal right of the king. He could not be 
sued without his consent. Consequently there developed the common 
law doctrine that "the king can do no wrong" and, thus, that no legal 
right exists against the authority that creates the law by which the 
people are governed. This practice was extended throughout feudal 
England, where the lord of the manor was not subject to suit in his 
own courts. Since the municipal corporation is an outgrowth of the 
sovereign power, the courts logically extended the protection of sover-
eign immunity to the municipality where it acts as an agent of the state 
9 Heieck v. City of Modesto, 64 Cal. 2d 229, 411 P.2d 105, 49 Cal. Rptr. 377 
(1966); Stang v. City of Mill Valley, 38 Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); City of 
Columbus v. Mcilwain, 205 Miss. 473, 38 So. 2d 921 (1949); Miralago Corp. v. 
Village of Kenilworth, 290 Ill. App. 230, 7 N.E.2d 602 (1937); Yowell v. Lebanon 
Waterworks Co., 254 Ky. 345, 71 S.W.2d 658 (1934); Stevens v. Manchester, 81 
N.H. 369, 127 A. 873 (1924); Trustees of Jennie DePauw Memorial Methodist 
Episcopal Church v. New Albany Waterworks, 193 Ind. 368, 140 N.E. 540 (1923); 
Wallace v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, 123 Md. 638, 91 A. 687 (1914); 
Butterworth v. City of Henrietta, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 61 S.W. 975 (1901); Miller 
v. City of Minneapolis, 75 Minn. 131, 77 N.W. 788 (1898); Springfield Fire & 
Marine Ins. Co. v. Village of Keeseville, 148 N.Y. 42, 42 N.E. 405 (1895). 
10 Hall v. City of Youngstown, 15 Ohio St. 2d 160, 239 N.E.2d 57 (1968); Malter 
v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 231, 198 A.2d 850 (1964); Lenzen v. City 
of New Braunfels, 13 Tex. Civ. App. 335, 35 S.W. 341 (1896). 
111970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 986, 260 N.E.2d 176, 177. 
12 18 McQuillan, Municipal Corporations §§53.01, 53.01a, at 104-105 (3d ed. 
1963) [hereinafter cited as McQuillan]. 
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or local tommunity for public benefit. The reason usually propounded 
for such an extension isone of public poi.icy for the protection of pub-
lic funds and public property.13 The premise was apparently that the 
individual himself, rather than the public at large, should suffer the 
loss, and the administration of public affairs must not be hindered by 
an unforeseeable drain on the public treasury at the discretion of the 
courts. 
Because of the inequities of allowing the municipality to be com-
pletei.y immune from tort liability, there developed the widely ap-
proved distinction that the municipal corporation acts both as an 
agent of the state in performing those duties of general concern owed 
by the state to all persons within its boundaries, and as a local govern-
ment ob~igated to provide its own community with municipal needs 
and conveniences.l4 Thus the city has dual obligations, and its liability 
depends upon a characterization of the function which the munici-
pality is performing at the time the negligent act occurs. When claims 
are made against the city for damages caused while acting in its govern-
mental capacity for citizens of the state, the municipal corporation is 
entitled to the same immunity as the sovereign.15 However, the city is 
held liable for its tortious conduct occurring while in the performance 
of services which could have been provided by a private corpora-
tion, for the benefit of persons within its corporate boundaries. While 
acting in this proprietary capacity, some municipalities have been sub-
jected to suit in the same manner as a private corporation or individual 
citizen.lo 
The courts have characterized certain functions as governmental in 
nature, including police and fire protection, public health, education, 
and care of the poor.17 The city cannot be held liable for its negligent 
conduct while per£orming these duties, in the absence of constitutional 
or statutory alterations, because the city is performing activities pro-
vided by the state in the public interest. 
However, when the municipality engages in activities not of a gov-
ernmental character but, 
... voluntarily assumed- powers intended for the private ad-
vantage and benefit of the locality and its inhabitants- there 
seems to be no sufficient reason why they should be relieved from 
that liability to suit and measure of actual damage to which an 
13 Id. §53.24, at 172-173. See also Lawyer, Birth and Death of Governmental 
Immunity, 15 C1ev.-Mar. L. Rev. 529 (1966). 
14 McQuillan §53.01a, at 104-105. 
15 Id. §53.24, at 167-181. See also cases cited therein. 
16 Id. §53.23, at 160-167. See also cases cited therein._ 
17 Gillies v. City of Minneapolis, 66 F. Supp. 467 (D. Minn. 1946;,; Stang v. City 
of, Mill Valley,.38Cal. 2d 486, 240 P.2d 980 (1952); Powell v. Village of Fenton, 
240 Mich. 94, 214 N.W. 968 (1927). 
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individual or private corporation exercising the same powers for 
a purpose essentially priv'!.te would be liab1e.1s 
Included in those functions found to be proprietary in nature are the 
construction and maintenance of municipal water19 and light plants, 
garages, and parking facilities, and the general management of munici-
pal property. While performing in its proprietary capacity, a city has 
been held liable in tort for the failure of its employees or agents to 
exercise ordinary care.2o 
A related approach to the governmental-proprietary distinction 
is one which distinguishes between legislative, judicial, or discretionary 
duties and ministerial functions. No tort liability is incurred by the 
municipality because of its failure to perform, or negligent perfor-
mance of, those legislative and judicial functions which are inherently 
discretionary, such as the failure to make and enforce appropriate laws 
and regulations or errors by courts in rendering their judgments.21 
However, where the city acts in its ministerial capacity, by making 
improvements and maintaining normal operations, there is no special 
discretion or judgment to be exercised but only a mere obedience by 
the city in performing defined duties for the local community, and 
therefore the municipality is liable for its negligent acts and omis-
sions.22 Moreover, although a municipality's duty may be legislative 
or judicial before it begins performance, once the city undertakes the 
execution of such duty, jurisdictions have frequently determined that 
it becomes absolute, and the municipality, having no further discre-
tion, acts ministerially.2s 
The initial step taken by the courts in extending the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity to political subdivisions occurred in England in 
Russell v. Men of Devon.24 Here the population of an unincorporated 
county was held to be immune from suit for damages caused by a 
defective bridge. The principal ground for decision was the lack of 
corporate funds from which satisfaction could be obtained, and the 
court would not allow the inhabitants of an entire county to be held 
liable. 
Acceptance of the doctrine expressed in Russell and its application 
to incorporated cities was adopted in the United States, but develop-
18 Galveston v. Posnainsky, 62 Tex. 118, 127 (1884). See also McQuillan §53.23, 
at 164-165. 
19 United States v. City of Minneapolis, 68 F. Supp. 585 (D. Minn. 1946); Helz 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 387 Pa. 169, 127 A.2d 89 (1956); Gordon v. City of Medford, 
331 Mass. ll9, ll7 N.E.2d 284 (1954); Cole Drug Co. v. City of Boston, 326 Mass. 
199, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950); Oakes Mfg. Co. v. City of New York, 206 N.Y. 221, 99 
N.E. 540 (1912). 
20 City of Phoenix v. Anderson, 65 Ariz. 3ll, 180 P.2d 219 (1947). 
21 McQuillan §§53.33, 53.34, at 205-207. See also cases cited therein. 
22 Id. §53.33, at 204-205. 
23 Ibid. 
24100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). 
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ment of the governmental- proprietary distinction did not occur until 
later.25 During the first half of the nineteenth century in this country, 
judicial opinions in cases concerning tort actions against municipali-
ties relied upon basic tort law as to whether a duty was owed by the 
city to the aggrieved individual.26 These decisions did not follow the 
distinctions between governmental and proprietary fun<:tions which 
had begun to develop with Bailey v. Mayor of New York. 27 With the 
advent of the industrial revolution and the increasing concentration 
of urban populations, the fear of municipal irresponsibility and an 
increased financial burden from suits against the city for its tortious 
conduct influenced the courts to apply the doctrine of municipal tort 
immunity, in the absence of legislative restriction, and adopt the 
previously ignored distinctions. 
It is submitted that, in applying the doctrine of municipal tort 
immunity to the facts of Reynolds, the Supreme Judicial Court should 
have given more attention to reconciling the governmental function of 
providing fire protection with the proprietary duty of establishing a 
waterworks system. Instead of finding that the city was not liable 
merely because the intended use of the water was for a g-overnmental 
purpose, the Court should have placed more emphasis upon the loca-
tion of the defect and the capacity in which the city was functioning 
at the time of its tortious conduct. Some of the decisions relied upon 
in Reynolds involved situations in which water damage occurred 
through negligent repair or maintenance of the city's waterworks 
system.2s Hence the city has been held liable on the ground that, in 
supplying water for local domestic purposes for profit, the city was 
performing a proprietary, or commercial, function. One of these situa-
tions necessitated joint consideration of governmental and proprietary 
functions, that is, situations in which water is supplied for use by the 
community both for private consumption and public fire protection. 
Only in Cole Drug Co. v. City of Boston2Bil did the need for such a 
consideration arise. In that case, the Court found the city liable for 
water damage occurring after the city had reasonable time in which 
to shut off the flow of water from a lateral pipe supplying a fire 
hydrant used exclusively to extinguish .·fires. Water was supplied 
through the waterworks system for both· domestic use and for the 
extinguishment of fires, and the hydrant and. lateral pipe were installed 
and maintained through the city's taxing power. The Court reasoned 
that since the city's negligence was related to the maintenance of the 
25 Note, Municipal Liability for Torts of Firemen, 31 Albany L. Rev. 256, 257 
(1967). 
26 Hutson v. Mayor of New York, 9 N.Y. 163 (1853); Mayor of Albany v. Cunliff, 
2 N.Y. 165 (1849); Martin v. Mayor of Brooklyn, I Hill 545 (N.Y. 1841). 
27 3 Hill 531 (N.Y; 1842). 
28 Gordon v. City of Medford, 311 Mass. 119, 117 N.E.2d 284 (H154); Cole Drug 
Co. v. City of Boston, 326 Mass. 199, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950). 
28a 326 Mass. 199, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950). 
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waterworks system not being used to extinguish a fire, the municipality 
was liable. The Court thus inferred that no .liability would befall the 
city, had the need for the water been to extinguish a fire. 
The immunity from tort liability conferred upon the city for the 
negligent acts of its agents or employees while engaged in providing 
fire protection is one of the most generally accepted areas to which the 
doctrine of municipal tort immunity is applied.29 The courts are 
reluctant to limit the use of the doctrine where an obvious govern-
mental duty to the public exists. Nevertheless, even in the areas of fire 
and police protection, the courts and the legislatures have found it 
necessary to restrict the doctrine's application.3o Moreover, in admi-
ralty law, the courts have consistently refused to invoke the doctrine 
of tort immunity even where the negligence of the municipality occurs 
while performing its governmental function of providing fire protec-
tion.31 It can be seen then that the city is not absolutely immune from 
liability for any tortious conduct connected either directly or indirectly 
with fire protection. 
The Court, relying strongly on Tainter for its determination of 
Reynolds, emphasized that fire protection is a governmental function. 
Apparently the Court did not recognize the full significance of the fact 
that the damage occurring in Reynolds, as in Tainter, did not result 
from the tortious acts of the firemen in performing the public duty of 
attempting to extinguish the conflagration, but rather from the negli-
gence of the city, in its corporate capacity, to maintain its waterworks 
system. The negligent act had already occurred before the firemen 
arrived on the scene, and it manifested itself only when an attempt 
was made to extinguish the fire. 
In considering the establishment and maintenance by a municipality 
of a waterworks system, it is generally accepted that the city acts in its 
proprietary capacity by benefitting the local community and performs 
ministerial duties in operating the system.32 Even where the initial 
capacity of the city in accepting plans for the establishment of such a 
29 Thon v. City of Los Angeles, 203 Cal. App. 2d 186, 21 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1962); 
J)elaw;~re Liquor Store v. Mayor and Council of Wilmington, 45 Del. 461, 75 
A.2d 272 (1950); King v. City of San Angelo, 66 S.W.2d 418 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933); 
Abihider v. City of Springfield, 277 Mass. 125, 177 N.E. 818 (1931); Frederick v. 
City of Columbus, 58 Ohio St. 538, 51 N.E. 35 (1898); Wilcox v. City of Chicago, 
107 Ill. 334 (1883); Robinson v. City of Evansville, 87 Ind. 334 (1882); Wheeler 
v. City of Cincinnati, 19 Ohio St. 19 (1869), · 
30 Ragans · v. City of Jacksonville, 106 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1965); City of Fairbanks 
v. Schaible, !175 P.2d 201 (Alaska 1962); Matlock v. New York Hyde Park Fire 
District, 16 App. Div. 2d 831, 228 N.Y.S.2d 894 (1962); Mich. Stat. Ann. §!1.996(105) 
(1969); N.Y. Gen. Munic. Law §50-c (McKinney 1965); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 75, §62!1 
(Purdon 1960). 
Sl Workman v. New York City, 179 U.S. 552 (1900). 
32 City of Waco v. Busby, 396 S.W.2d 469 (Tex. Civ;. App. 1965); Gordon v. 
City of Medford, 331 Mass. 119, 117 N.E.2d284_ (1954); Cole Drug Co. v~ City of 
Boston, 326 Mass. 119, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950). See alsO MCQUilliln §5!1.09, at 129. 
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public benefit is considered discretionary, when the municipality enters 
into this area it acts ministerially while operating and maintaining the 
waterworks system and is liable if it does so negligently.83 
Where water damage has occurred from defects in a waterworks 
system providing water for both community benefit and prevention of 
fires, courts have usually found the municipality liable, even where, as 
in Cole Drug, the defect was connected with fire hydrants used ex-
clusively for fire purposes.34 On the other hand, courts have applied 
municipal tort immunity where damage is caused by a fire which the 
city cannot extinguish due to an inadequate supply of water, though 
the defects causing the lack of water are also inherent in the same 
waterworks system.s5 As in Reynolds, the courts emphasize fire protec-
tion where the facts are not related to the negligence of firemen in 
performing their duties or in utilizing fire fighting apparatus for the 
maintenance of which they are solely responsible. Rather, the facts 
concern the negligence of the city in failing to adequately maintain 
its waterworks system and fire hydrants. Any subsequent damage oc-
curring as a result of this negligence is irrelevant. 
In City of Richmond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp.,S6 the 
court considered the capacity in which the city was performing at the 
time of its negligent conduct and not the purpose for which the water 
was used. There, the municipality was held liable for the flooding of 
plaintiff's warehouse due to the negligence of a municipal. employee in 
failing to shut off water leading to plaintiff's sprinkler system. The 
court stated that the public could benefit from the use of sprinkler 
systems and that there was no charge for the water used. Nevertheless, 
the court went on to explain that since the operation of a water depart-
ment is a private, or proprietary, right, although water may be utilized 
also to extinguish fires, the city is responsible for the negligent acts, not 
of its firemen, but of its employees of the water department.37 
The previously noted distinction drawn in most jurisdictions con-
cerning either the purposes for which the water was intended or the 
form of the subsequent damage (the governmental- ministerial distinc-
tion) is susceptible to attack when the damage results solely from 
negligent operation of the system. In Stang v. City of Mill Valley,3s the 
33 McQuillan §53.38, at 218. 
34 Cole Drug Co. v. City of Boston, 326 Mass. 119, 93 N.E.2d 556 (1950); Boyle 
v. City of Pittsburgh, 145 Pa. Super. 325, 21 A.2d 243 (1941); Lober v. Kansas City, 
74 S.W.2d 815 (Mo. 1934), afj'd, 339 Mo. 1087, 100 S.W.2d 267 (1936); City of Rich-
mond v. Virginia Bonded Warehouse Corp., 148 Va. 60, 138 S.E. 503 (1927); 
Aschoff v. City of Evansville, 34 Ind. App. 25, 72 N.E. 279 (1904); Dunstan v. 
City of New York, 91 App. Div. 355, 86 N.Y.S. 562 (1904); City of Chicago v. Selz, 
Schwab & Co., 202 Ill. 545, 67 N.E. 386 (1903). 
35 See note 9 supra. 
36 148 Va. 60, 138 S.E. 503 (1927). 
37 Id. at 72-73, 138 S.E. at 507. 
38 38 Cal. 2d 4~6, 240 .P.2d 980(1952). 
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plaintiff's house was partially destroyed by a fire due to the failure of 
the city to maintain its waterworks system. The fire hydrant adjacent 
to plaintiff's property became clogged with refuse, and it was impos-
sible for the fire department to obtain a sufficient quantity of water 
from the hydrant to extinguish the fire. The plaintiff brought his 
action under the Public Liability Act,39 which established the liability 
of municipalities for certain misconduct in the performance of govern-
mental functions. The majority of the court reasoned that the statute 
applied only to situations where the damages were caused through 
the use of the defective property which proximately caused the dam-
age.40 The court, in denying relief, restricted itself to the governmental 
duty to provide fire protection and reasoned that where mere non-
feasance occurs, no liability attaches to the city. However, the negli-
gence which proximately caused the loss was not related to the 
equipment maintained solely by the fire department, but to main-
tenance of the city's waterworks system. The damage was caused not 
by the nonfeasance of the firemen, but by the misfeasance of the 
municipality while acting in its proprietary capacity. Therefore, it is 
submitted that the city should not have been immune from liability. 
Another distinction drawn by many courts is that a private water 
company supplying the city with water for both domestic use and the 
extinguishment of fires is not liable to a private citizen whose property 
is destroyed by fire due to the water company's negligence in not 
providing an adequate amount of water.41 The rationale is that a 
duty to supply water is owed only to the city and not to the private 
citizen, and if such a duty does exist, the water company is immune 
from liability where the damage occurs while it was performing a 
governmental function of the city. However, in a minority of cases 
finding the water company liable to a private citizen, the courts empha-
size that the water company obtains payment by the city through taxes 
levied upon its inhabitants, and the water company has use of the 
streets and hydrants for its own purposes. The company thereby as-
sumes a duty to individual taxpayers to supply water for the extin-
guishment of fires, and will be held liable for the breach of that duty.42 
The latter view seems more equitable since the protection of the tax-
payer is the purpose for the contract between the city and the water 
company, and any injury to this taxpayer through the negligence of a 
39 Cal. Stats. 1923, c. 328, §2. Stats. 1949, c. 81, §1, relating to liability of local 
agencies for injuries from dangerous or defective conditions of public property, 
was derived from Stats. 1923, c. 328, §2, and was repealed by Stats. 1963, c. 1681, 
§18. For present statute, see Cal. Govt. Code §§835 et seq. (West 1966). 
40 38 Cal. 2d 486, 489, 240 P.2d 980, 982 (1952). 
41 Moch Co. v; Rensselaer Water Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928); Trustees 
of Jennie DePauw Memorial Methodist Episcopal Church v. New Albany Water· 
works, 193 Ind. 368, 140 N.E. 540 (1923). 
42 Doyle v. South Pittsburgh Water Co., 414 Pa. 199, 199 A.2d 875 (1964); Mugge 
v. Tampa Waterworks Co., 52 Fla. 371, 42 So. 81 (1906); Fisher v. Greensboro 
Water Supply Co., 128 N.C. 375, 38 S.E. 912 (1901). 
0 
• , • 
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private water company should be actionable. Where the negligence 
occurs in the water company's duty to supply water, for which it is 
paid irrespective of its intended use, governmental immunity should 
not be extended to protect the private company. Moreover, in those 
minority decisions which do find the private water company liable to 
the individual citizen for an inadequate supply of water, even where no 
privity of contract exists, liability is based upon a duty owed each citi-
zen to perform non-negligently. Hence no reason is apparent as to why 
the city should not also be held liable when it performs the same duty 
itself. 
The opinion of Justice Musmanno in Malter v. South Pittsburgh 
Water Co.4s seems to present a reasonable approach in reconciling the 
conflict between the governmental function of fire protection and the 
proprietary duty of operating a waterworks system. The case involved 
an action against a water company and a borough, or municipal cor-
poration, for loss of plaintiffs' home by fire when the city's fire hydrant 
became rusted, decayed and clogged, preventing an adequate supply 
of water to extinguish the fire. Justice Musmanno held that the home-
owners' complaint stated a sufficient cause of action on the theory of 
the borough's negligence in failing to discharge its proprietary duty to 
supply sufficient water. Therefore, the borough could also be held 
liable, along with the water company, for the latter's negligence in 
operating its waterworks system. He explained that 
[t]he test to be applied is not the form of the damage but the 
processes of the negligence which ·led to the damage. Did the act 
of negligence occur during the performance of a governmental or 
proprietary function? Once it is determined that the negligence 
occurred while the municipality was engaged in a proprietary 
function, liability inevitably attaches. To hold otherwise would 
lead to the incongruous result that liability would attach in every 
case where the negligence involved the maintenance of fire 
hydrants except where fire follows the negligence.44 
Justice Musmanno refused to draw any distinctions which would apply 
municipal tort immunity, but rather he examined the location and 
time at which the negligent act occurred and found that the city had 
acted in its proprietary capacity. Subsequent damage was not deter-
minative of the municipality's liability. In concluding, he stated that 
... [t]he allegations support a finding that the defendants had 
breached a duty owed to theplaintiffs to use reasonable care in 
the operation and maintenance of the water system which they 
erected and thafthe breach of that duty was the proxilmate cause 
of the plaintiffs' loss.n-
43 414 Pa. 2!11, 198 A.2d 850 (1964). 
44 Id. at 237, 198 A.2d at 853. 
45 Id. at 238, 198 A.2d at 853. 
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The opinion in Malter was followed by the Supreme Court of Ohio 
in Hall v. City of Youngstown,46 involving the death of the plaintiff's 
child in a fire which destroyed his home. The firemen were impeded 
in their attempts to put out the blaze because the nearest fire hydrant 
was inoperative due to the negligent failure of the city to maintain 
that hydrant in good operating condition. The court held that if the 
negligence of the municipality was the proximate cause of the child's 
death, it could not escape liability through the defense of immunity. 
After citing Malter and refusing to follow past decisions finding no 
liability,47 the court stated that 
(i]t is a rather elemental conclusion that the utility of a hydrant 
stems from its connection with a water supply system. Its primary 
use is to make immediately available a supply of water for the 
extinguishment of fires. That supply is accessible only because 
piped to the hydrant area through water mains. The problem in 
this case, as wesee it, is the question of where water supply (pro-
prietary in nature) ends, and fire fighting (governmental in nature) 
begins. We believe it to be at the end of the hydrant nozzle.48 
In examining the specific factual situations, both the Pennsylvania 
(Malter) and Ohio (Hall} Supreme Courts, unlike the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts in Reynolds, realized that the negligence in-
volved .did not originate with the city's duty to provide fire protection 
but rather in. the maintenance of its waterworks system, a proprietary 
function to which the doctrine of municipal tort immunity does not 
apply. The distinctions made by many courts, and by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Reynolds, among the uses for which the water was 
intended seem arbitrary. Where the negligence proximately causing 
the damage occurs in the maintenance and operation of a city's water-
works system, municipal tort immunity should not be allowed, ir-
respective of the form of the resulting damage. If the municipality is 
held liable for water damage caused by tortious conduct related to its 
waterworks system, reason dictates that it should be liable for damage 
by fire that is the direct result of such conduct. 
The rationale proffered by the courts in Malter and Hall had already 
been applied almost seventy-five years ago in Lenzen v. New Braun-
fels,49 although it has not been followed in later Texas decisions.oo 
There the city negligently permitted its waterworks system to fall 
into disrepair a11d allowed water in a standpipe to become so low as to 
afford insufficient pressure .to supply water. The city of New Braunfels 
voluntarily maintaine.d a system of waterworks for its own advantage 
46 15 Ohio St. 2d 160 •. 239 N.E.2d 57 (1968). 
47 Id. at' 164ci65, 239 N.E.2d at 60. 
481d. at .165, 239 N.E.2d at 60. 
49 .13 Tex. Civ.. App. 335; 35 S.W. 341 (1896). 
50 See, e.g., Butterworth v. City of Henrietta, 25 Tex. Civ. App. 467, 61 S.W. 975 
(1901). 
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arid profit, which system supplied water for the extinguishment of fires. 
The Court of Civil Appeals held the city liable to an inhabitant, who 
with his taxes had paid for the use and benefit of said waterworks, for 
the consequent destruction of his property. The court reasoned that the 
operation of the waterworks was not a governmental function, but 
rather was performed by the city in its corporate capacity for the benefit 
of itself and its inhabitants. After an exhaustive discussion, the court 
queried that 
... [i]f municipal liability is admitted, which undoubtedly it is 
in cases of damages sustained by reason of negligence :in the con-
trol and management of streets,. sewers, drains, docks, bridges, gas 
and electric works, and other corporate property used for the local 
advantage of the city, what reasoning upon principle may be ad-
vanced that will distinguish these cases which so establish liability 
upon principles of common law, from the case at bar?51 
It would seem that the Supreme Judicial Court in Reynolds should 
have taken notice of the trend in many states to abrogate, or at least 
restrict, the doctrine of municipal tort immunity as part of a con-
tinuing movement to do away with sovereign immunity.52 The Su-
preme Court of Florida, in Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, stated: 
... The modern city is in a substantial measure a large business 
institution. While it enjoys many of the basic powers of govern-
ment, it nonetheless is an incorporated organization which ex-
ercises those powers primarily for the benefit of the people within 
the municipal limits who enjoy the services rendered pursuant to 
the powers. To continue to endow this type of organization with 
sovereign divinity appears to us to predicate the law of the 
Twentieth Century upon an Eighteenth Century anachronism.53 
Accepting this view, the Florida court, along with other jurisdictions, 
has recognized the necessity of modifying the prevailing doctrine of 
municipal tort immunity as applied to actions for negligence in the 
performance of public functions. 
The arguments for retention of the doctrine, though apparently 
51 13 Tex. Civ. App. 335, 339-340, 35 S.W. 341, 342 (1896). 
52 Parish v. Pitts, 244 Ark. 1239, 429 S.W.2d 45 (1968); Stone v. State Highway 
Commn., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963); Rice v. Clark County, 79 Nev. 253, 
382 P.2d 605 (1963); Holytz v .. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 
(1962); Spanel v. Moundview School Dist., 118 N.W.2d 795 (Minn. 1962); Muskopf 
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); Molitor v. Kaneland 
Community Unit Dist. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959); Kamau v. Hawaii 
County, 41 Hawaii 527 (1957); Hargrove v. Town of Cocoa Beach, 96 So. 2d 130 
(Fla. 1957). See also Note, Governmental Immunity from Tort Liability: Penn-
sylvania's Trend Toward Abolition, 4 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 441 (1966); Note, Torts 
-Sovereign Immunity- Effect of Insurance, 43 Ore. L. Rev. 267 (1964); McQuillan 
§§53.03, 53.24a, at Ill, 179. 
53 96 So. 2d 130, 133 (Fla. 1957). 
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compelling to many courts, are open to criticism. The strongest argu-
ment involves the nature and scope of a municipality's functions. Pub-
lic agencies engage in activities far beyond those of private agencies, 
affecting a much larger segment of the public. These agencies are not 
free to discontinue operations due to high costs or the prohibitively 
high risk of liability. Hence, the individual, rather than the public, 
should arguably bear the burden of loss. Such an argument had a 
sound basis in the past when cities and towns obtained little money 
through taxes, could not withstand heavy claims, and were unincor-
porated and susceptible to unlimited liability. However, although 
cities remain financially unstable, their losses through tort claims for 
their negligence can now be passed on to the private citizen in the 
form of taxes, or be covered by liability insurance. In many cases the 
risk of loss should not be borne by an innocent individual, such as the 
Reynolds Boat Company, who suffers extreme hardship because of the 
city's negligence. That segment of society which benefits from the 
activity that produces the injury is, firstly, in a better financial posi-
tion to bear the loss; secondly, since the municipal corporation is 
merely a manifestation of the local community, every inhabitant should 
contribute toward reimbursing another citizen who is injured through 
the city's negligence. Perhaps legislative action could provide payment 
to an injured party. Such provisions could statutorily limit the amount 
collectible from the city to prevent an undue drain on the munici-
pality's treasury. If a greater likelihood of injuries exists because of 
the extensive activities of government, then, where possible, compensa-
tion of tort victims should be a justifiable and expected cost of govern-
ment. The probability of increased governmental expenditures might 
serve as an incentive in improving responsibility and efficiency of city 
officials and employees. 
A municipality that is subject to liability for its tortious acts can 
minimize any consequent loss through insurance. Accompanying the 
restriction of municipal tort immunity by some courts has been, alter-
natively, the establishment by several legislatures of provisions en-
abling municipalities to obtain liability insurance.54 Where such 
insurance is made available, courts have held the municipality liable 
on the basis that the procurement of insurance is a waiver of govern-
mental immunity.55 Even where liability insurance is not provided by 
the legislature, the courts, in restricting certain areas of immunity, 
54 Fla. Stat. Ann. §240.28 (1961); Mich. Stat. Ann. §3.996(109); Wyo. Stat. 
§§15.1-15.4 (1965). Massachusetts does not as yet have provisions for liability in-
surance to protect municipal corporations for negligence while performing govern-
mental functions; it presently has G.L., c. 40, §5(1), which allows municipalities to 
purchase liability insurance to indemnify their employees who are liable in tort 
actions. 
55 Bailey v. City of Knoxville, 113 F. Supp. 3 (E.D. Tenn. 1953), aff'd, 222 F.2d 520 
(6th Cir. 1955); Marshall v. City of Green Bay, 18 Wis. 2d 496, 118 N.W.2d 715 
(1963); Beach v. City of Springfield, 32 Ill. App. 2d 256, 177 N.E.2d 436 (1961). 
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could supply the necessary impetus to obtain the passagE! of these laws. 
Some might retort that it is the individual's duty to protect himself 
through his own insurance. However, insurance is sometimes difficult 
to obtain in certain high risk situations. A pers.()n unable to obtain 
fire insurance on his property must either suffer total loss or dose dowri 
his business. Where the city is attempting to rebuild its impoverished 
areas, insurance protection provided to owners of property would en-
courage them to remain and contribute to such redevelopment. 
With the increased use of liability insurance there has developed a 
general acceptance both of the social and economic advantages of risk-
spreading and 
... of the concept that economic loss due to accidental injury 
should be distributed over large groups rather than falling cata-
strophically upon the individual. Then again, the whole thrust of 
this century's social, economic, andpolitical philosophy has been 
toward the development and protection of individual security.56 
Supporting this trend, the Appellate Court of Illinois, in Thomas v. 
Broadlands Community Consolidated School District 201, stated: 
The whole doctrine o£ governmental immunity from liability 
for torts rests on a rotten foundation. It is almost incredible that 
in this modern age of comparative sociological enlightenment, and 
in a republic the medieval absolutism supposed to be implicit in 
the maxim, "the king can do no wrong," should exempt the 
various branches of the government from liability for their torts, 
and that the entire burden of damage resulting from the wrongful 
acts of the government should be imposed upon the single indi-
vidual who suffers the injury, rather than distributed among the 
entire community constituting the government, where it could be 
borne without hardship upon any individual, and where it justly 
belongs. 57 
In fact, in Williams v. City of Detroit,5B Justice Edwards, favoring 
reversal of the lower court's dismissal of the action on the grounds of 
sovereign immunity, -acknowledged that the Michigan courts had taken 
judicial notice of the protection available to the municipality by means 
56 Lloyd, The Rising Tide of Liability, 17 Syraeuse L. Rev. 127 (1965). 
57 348 Ill. App. 567, 574, 109 N.E.2d 636, 640 (1952). 
58 364 Mich. 231, 111 N.W.2d (1961). The Supreme Court of Michigan affirmed, 
by an equally divided court, the Michigan Circuit Court's granting of a motion 
to dismiss the suit. Four justices favored reversal of the lower court on the basis 
that sovereign immunity should be abolished prospectively and for the instant case. 
Three affirming justices voted to follow stare decisis and retain the doctrine. Jus· 
tice Black, the fourth affirming justice, voted to abrogate the doctl'ine only prospec-
tively and limited his decision to the question of municipal immunity, not sovereign 
immunity in general, stating that "like causes of action arising hereafter will, unless 
and until the legislature rises and ordains otherwise, be treated in the courts of 
Michigan .1!6 '.typicar iu!gligente cases." Id. at ~287~ -11! N;W.2d aL18 .. 
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of liability insurance. He took exception to the approach of the affirm-
ing justices, who applied sovereign immunity to the case while stating 
that the doctrine should be abrogated. 59 
Another argument, which was also mentioned by the Supreme 
Judicial Court in Reynolds, is that any action to be undertaken in 
restricting municipal tort immunity must be accomplished by the 
legislative, not the judicial, branch.6° However, the decisions in Russell 
v. Men of Devon61 and in subsequent cases establishing municipal tort 
immunity have been based upon court-made law. It is submitted that, 
since the doctrine is of judicial origin, legislative action to change it 
is not mandatory. Courts have on numerous occasions announced their 
right to abrogate or modify municipal tort immunity. They have re-
jected arguments that the doctrine, although of judicial origin, has 
become so firmly entrenched in our public policy that only the legis-
lature can change it.62 If a court is hesitant to abolish municipal tort 
immunity, it could, by exercise of its equity power, restrict the scope 
of the doctrine. This may lead to a re-examination of the doctrine by 
the legislative branch, and, as has been the case in several jurisdictions, 
result in passage of provisions for comprehensive liability insurance.63 
Such initiative by the courts in Massachusetts could well lead to the 
expansion of the existing liability insurance statutes. 
Even where it is accepted that the courts have the power to restrict 
the application of municipal tort immunity, the argument that prece-
dent must control is urged. However, courts have justified their deci-
sions not to apply municipal tort immunity by noting the continual 
sociological and economic changes which invariably alter our system of 
priorities and necessitate modification of past rules of law. Hence 
Justice Edwards' statement in Williams: 
But stare decisis in its most rigorous form does not prevent the 
courts from correcting their own errors, or from establishing new 
59 Id. at 259, Ill N.W.2d at 24. 
60 1970 Mass. Adv. Sh. 985, 987, 260 N.E.2d 176, 178. This view has also been 
taken by courts of other jurisdictions. See, e.g., Fette v. City of St. Louis, 366 
S.W.2d 446 (Mo. 1963); Kirksey v. City of Fort Smith, 227 Ark. 630, 300 S.W.2d 
257 (1957). 
61 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1788). 
62 Holytz v. City of Milwaukee, 17 Wis. 2d 26, 115 N.W.2d 618 (1962); Muskopf 
v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); McAndrew v. Mularchuk, 
33 N.J. 172, 162 A.2d 820 (1960); Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, 18 
Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). See also Note, Governmental Immunity from Tort 
Liability: Pennsylvania's Trend Toward Abolition, 4 Duquesne U.L. Rev. 441 (1966). 
63 Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 55 Cal. 2d 211, 359 P.2d 457 (1961); 
Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit Dist. 302, 18 Ill. 2d 11, 163 N.E.2d 89 (1959). 
See also Vanlandingham, Local Governmental Immunity Re-examined, 61 Nw. 
U.L. Rev. 237 (1966); Note, Illinois Tort Claims Act: A New Approach to Municipal 
Tort Immunity in Illinois, 61 Nw. U.L. Rev. 265 (1966); Note, Sovereign Immu-
nity: Will Ohio Follow Michigan's Lead?, 31 U. Cin. L. Rev. 307 (1962). 
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rules of case law when facts and circumstances of modern life have 
rendered an old rule unworkable and unjust.64 
Moreover, Justice Musmanno, indicating his approval of departing 
from stare decisis to attain an equitable result, explained: 
A rule that has become insolvent has no place in the active 
market of current enterprise. When a rule offends against reason, 
when it is at odds with every precept of natural justice, and when 
it cannot be defended on its own merits, but has to defend alone 
on a discredited genealogy, courts not only possess the inherent 
power to repudiate, but, indeed, it is required by the very nature 
of judicial function, to abolish such a rule.611 
It seems evident that the Supreme Judicial Court in Reynolds could 
have taken several other approaches than it did in deciding whether 
the doctrine of municipal tort immunity applies where the city is 
negligent in failing to supply an adequate amount of water to extin-
guish a fire. It is submitted that had the Court remanded the case for 
trial by denying municipal immunity to the city on the basis either that 
the negligence occurred while the municipality was performing a 
proprietary function, or that the doctrine itself ought to be re-
examined, an inequitable outcome might have been avoided and a step 
forward taken toward abolition of an outdated doctrine. 
RoBERT DAMBRov 
64 364 Mich. 231, 256, Ill N.W.2d l, 23 (1961). 
65 Flagiello v. Pennsylvania Hosp., 417 Pa. 486, 513, 208 A.2d 193 .. 206 (1965). 
63
Sikora: Chapter 24: State and Local Government
Published by Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School, 1970
